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RISK AND REGULATION: U.S.
REGULATORY POLICY ON GENETICALLY
MODIFIED FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
EMILY MARDEN *
Abstract: Since the 1980s, successive White House Administrations have
shaped federal policy on genetically modified food and agriculture to
(1) be product-based, (2) presume low risk from genetic modification,
and (3) review GM products under existing federal standards. For two
decades, the FDA, USDA, and EPA have erected a regulatory framework
for GM products based on these three principles. This Article reviews
the history and structure of this framework and the challenges that it
has faced as more GM products have entered the market. The Article
concludes that the three basic principles of federal GM policy may have
to be reconsidered and redirected as genetic modification continues to
grow as a force in world commerce.
INTRODUCTION
In February 2002, United States Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick undertook a grand tour of Africa to stake out a position in
the emerging trade war with Europe over genetically modified
("GM") foods.' Zoellick's mission was straightforward: he hoped to
gain the support of African nations for the U.S. risk-based position on
GM foods.2
 Zoellick has reportedly stated that he is "strongly consider-
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Neil King, jr., U.S. Official Courts African Allies for Brewing Biotech-Food Fight, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 22, 2002, at A24. Note that in this Article, I use the terminology "GM" foods or
agriculture to refer collectively to plants/crops that have been modified using genetic
engineering techniques. This terminology is used as an alternative to "genetically engi-
neered foods," "Genetically Engineered Organisms" ("GEOs"), "Genetically Modified Or-
ganisms" ("GMOs"), or "agricultural biotechnology."
2 Id. It is not clear that Zoellick was entirely successful in his mission. In late July 2002,
Zimbabwe rejected thousands of tons of U.S. emergency food aid consisting of corn be-
cause the donations contained genetically modified varieties. According to the reports,
733
734	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 44:733
ing" filing a suit against the European Commission in the World
Trade Organization for blocking the import of U.S. bioengineered
seeds. 3
 U.S. corn farmers alone say they are losing more than $200
million a year because of the closed European market, and that mil-
lions more are being lost on soy, cotton, potato and other products.
Zoellick and the U.S. government are ultimately hoping to dem-
onstrate that the U.S. approach to the technology is the correct one
and that alternative approaches should not be allowed to slow the in-
dustry or impede trade. Indeed, as Zoellick stated, the United States is
willing to bring a suit before the World Trade Organization to stop
other countries from unduly regulating GM products. 4 The United
States rejects restrictive regulations on GM products on grounds that
they are not based on verifiable scientific risk. Instead, the United
States takes the position that the product should be permitted to
flourish in the marketplace in the absence of proven hazards.
The U.S. approach has three elements. First, the focus is exclu-
sively on the end product of GM technology, rather than on the fact
that the process of genetic modification is used. Second, U.S. policy
holds that in the absence of verifiable "scientific risk," there is no rea-
son to bar a technology from being introduced and integrated. 5 Fi-
nally, the United States maintains that GM technology is on a contin-
uum with other agricultural innovations, and that any risks are of the
same kind as those of "traditionally" produced foods. On this ground,
the United States has maintained that existing regulatory oversight is
adequate to safeguard the public. 6
 It is important to note, however,
Zimbabwe was concerned that if some of the corn was used as seed it could contaminate
the native crop, and mike it unexportahle to Europe. Rick Weiss, Starved for Food, Zimbabwe
Rejects U.S. Biotech Corm, WASH. PosT, July 31, 2002, at Al2.
3 "' I personally am of the view that we now need to bring a case,' Zoellick said at alit'.
9 press conference when asked about the ongoing conflict with the Europeans." Zoellick
Calls For WTO Clae Against EU Biotechnology Moratorium, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 10, 2003.
4
 As this Article went to press, the United States announced that it was filing a case in
the World Trade Organization challenging the four-year-old moratorium by the European
Union on authorizing GM crops. The United States is joined in its position by Argentina,
Canada, and Egypt. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.
and Cooperating Countries File WTO Case Against EU Moratorium on Biotech Foods and
Crops (May 13, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/05/03-31.1am.
5 See FDA, A Dt:scturrioN or THE U.S. FOOD SArm SYSTEM (2000). available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/codex/system.htm.
0 See generally Marsh Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the United
States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 Comm. J. Euu. L. 525 (1998). In her article, Marsh
Echols explains the U.S. predilection for a risk-based approach as reflective of the national
embrace of new technologies. She credits the European approach to the fact that food-
safety laws are more reflective of local tradition.
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that the nature of the scientific risks that could demonstrate risk or
harm are not defined. Instead, the U.S. policy tends, to minimize the
existence of any risks associated with GM products, and directs the
agencies to refrain from hypothesizing about or affirmatively search-
ing for safety or environmental concerns.
This approach to regulating GM foods stands in contrast—in
global politics—to an approach based on the precautionary principle.
In its most general articulation, the precautionary principle states that
where there is alack of certainty about safety, a technology should be
avoided or at least limited.? In the global debate over GM foods, the
European Commission has taken a precautionary approach toward
the technology,8
 and has permitted only limited varieties of GM spe-
cies to be introduced in Europe. To support this approach, the Euro-
peans focus on the fact. that the GM process itself is new and therefore
may have unintended hazardous consequences.
For its part, the U.S. approach to GM foods has helped the indus-
try grow: the U.S. maintains dominance of the agricultural biotech-
nology industry worldwide, and the use of GM products continues to
spread. At. the same time, there have been costs associated with the
U.S. policy. There are repeated complaints from non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs"), consumer groups, and trade partners that
safety, allergenicity, and environmental issues have not been ade-
quately considered, even as the United Slates sees more and more GM
products in development. In addition, these groups vociferously op-
pose the U.S. refusal to implement GM food labeling.
The aim of this Article is to review and assess the approach
adopted by the U.S. government and its regulatory agencies. The U.S.
perspective was initiated by the Reagan White House as the technol-
ogy emerged in the 1980s, and was further developed by both the
George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations. As GM products
moved into the marketplace, the tenets of this perspective have been
subject to questions. Already the focus on product, rather than proc-
ess, has been adjusted to account for sonie of the concerns associated
7
 See generally Katherine Barrett & Carolyn Raffensperger, From Principle to Action: Apply-
ing the Precautionary Principle to Agricultural Biotechnology, 4 BIOTECHNOLOGY 4
(2002); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 20
RES. L. & ECoN, 71 (2002).
B
 For a good general outline of the E.U. articulation of the Precautionary Principle,
See EUR. ENVTL. AGENCY, !Ali; LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS: THE PRECAUTIONARY
Pituactigs. 1806-2000 (2001), available at http://reports.eea.mint/environmental_issua_
report_2001_22/en.
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with genetic engineering of foods. It is also likely that the U.S. con-
ception of "scientific risk" will need to be broadened so that concerns
about allergenicity, safety, and environmental issues be considered.
The United States may be forced to reconsider further elements of its
policy as GM products continue to enter world commerce.
The Article begins with a brief review of the development of U.S.
policy under the Reagan (1980-1988) and George H.W. Bush (1988-
1992) Administrations. 9
 It then reviews the development and imple-
mentation of the regulatory framework through the three agencies
that have primary responsibility for oversight of the technology: the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the Department of Agricul-
ture ("USDA"), and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").
I. HISTORY
A. Building a Framework
GM food and agriculture products began reaching the commer-
cialization stage in the 1980s. The first generation of products has in-
cluded agricultural commodities, such as soy, cotton, corn, and ca-
nola. Most of these products have been modified to incorporate
pesticidal elements within the plant itself (e.g., Bacillus thuringis
("Bt") corn is modified to incorporate the pesticide Bacillus thur-
ingis). The promise is that use of such plants can reduce the amounts
of pesticide needed. Other plants have been introduced that have
been modified for resistance to use of specific pesticides. For exam-
ple, Roundup Ready soy is a Monsanto product that has resistance to
the Roundup Ready herbicide incorporated into its genome. There-
fore, the herbicide can be used on the soy without concern for dam-
aging the soy plant itself.
Earlier genetic technologies had been the subject of regulatory
controversy when they emerged. During the 1970s, the development
of recombinant DNA ("rDNA") techniques sparked public concerns
that mutant organisms might be released into the environment, caus-
ing serious damage. In response, communities such as Cambridge,
Massachusetts banned genetic research within their boundaries and
there were numerous protests of government discussions of the tech-
nology. To counter the threat of further local and national govern-
9
 References to the Bush Administration are to that of President George H.W. Bosh
(1989-1993).
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ment regulation of this technology, scientists opted to introduce re-
sponsible self-regulation.i°
A group of scientists organized a conference at Asilomar in Feb-
ruary 1975 and met there behind closed doors to reach a consensus
on self-regulation of research involving rDNA techniques. The par-
ticipants agreed on interim guidelines, which were then adopted by
the National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), a research-funding arm of
the U.S. government. In the absence of anything else, the guidelines
became the de facto standard for private research. Until 1984, the
NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee was the primary federal
entity that reviewed and monitored federally funded DNA research."
Ultimately, the apparent effectiveness of the Asilomar guidelines in
ensuring the safety of research may have set the stage for declining
public interest in novel genetic techniques. In addition, the lack of
safety crises in subsequent years helped rDNA research gain respect-
ability.
GM foods also raised safety and environmental concerns when
their introduction appeared imminent in the I980s. There were hear-
ings in Congress on the technology and a movement to draft new laws
specific to its application,t 2 The United States, however, had devel-
oped its position as the world leader in biotechnology as a result of
decades of well-funded basic research, and scientists, along with sup-
porters in the Reagan Administration, were reluctant to relinquish
this position." The White House therefore worked hard to ensure
that. U.S. dominance would continue, and thwarted legislative inter-
ference."
10
 For an excellent analysis of these events, see Dorothy Nelkin, Threats and Promises:
Negotiating the Control of Research, DAEnEws, Spring 1978. See also SHELDON KRIMSKY, Bto-
TECH NICS AND Socurrc THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL GENETICS (1991).
11 On controversies over rDNA. see generally MtcnAut, Root:lis, Bionnznito (1977);
NICHOLAS EVADE, THE ULTEMNIT EXPERIMENT: MAN-MADE EVOLU'IlON (1977).
12 See, e.g.. Planned Releases of Genetically-Altered Organisms: The Status of Government Re-
search and Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong. 72 (1985); Biotechnology Regulation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong. 98-193 (1984); Environmental Implications of Genetic Engineering: Hearing Before
the Subomm, on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology
of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong. 2-3 (1983).
1s For a detailed discussion of these developments, see KRIMSKY, supra note 10.
II See Jim Drinkard, Biotechnology Predicted to Bring Big Farm Changes, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 21, 1985 (quoting Dr. Bernadine H ealy, Deputy Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy worrying that Congressional hearings raised "concerns that biotechnol-
ogy may . • • be an example of regulation stifling leadership").
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Against the backdrop of an emerging U.S. lead in GM tech-
niques, the Reagan and Bush Administrations took steps toward out-
lining a federal regulatory policy that would ensure safety. 15
 As with
rDNA, the theory was that effective industry and scientific self-
regulation could preclude burdensome or inhibitory legislation.
Thus, through a series of working groups and policy statements begun
in the mid 1980s, the Reagan and Bush Administrations developed
three tenets of U.S. policy designed to ensure the development of the
industry: (1) U.S. policy would focus on the product of GM tech-
niques, not the process itself, (2) only regulation grounded in
verifiable scientific risks would be tolerated, and (3) GM products are
on a continuum with existing products and, therefore, existing stat-
utes are sufficient to review the products. Within these tenets, indus-
try would be encouraged to continue its rapid pace of development
without regulatory impediments.
As an initial response to Congressional interest in legislating on
the new technology, the Reagan Administration created an inter-
agency working group within the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy ("OSTP"), which it charged with drafting an over-
all federal framework for food biotechnology.la In 1984, the OSTP
working group published the Coordinated Framework for Regulation
of Biotechnology ("Coordinated Framework"), which proposed regu-
lating genetically engineered products only according to measurable
risks. The group expressly embraced an approach stating that prod-
ucts of biotechnology should be regulated in the same way as prod-
ucts of other technologies. In the legal context, therefore, the draft
Coordinated Framework proposed that new biotechnology products
be regulated under the existing web of federal statutory authority and
regulation."
After soliciting comments from the public, the OSTP working
group finalized a version of the Coordinated Framework in 1986 simi-
lar to the draft version. This final policy document proclaimed again
16
 SHELDON KRIMSKY & ROGER P. WRUBEL, AGRICUL'IlfRAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 111E
ENVIRONNIENT: SCIENCE, POLICY, AND SOCIAL ISSUE 249-51 (1996).
16
 Another impetus for the creation of this group may have been the legal challenge
brought by biotechnology gadfly Jeremy Rifkin in 1984 against the National Institutes of
Health that forced the Reagan Administration to consider and propose policies to guide
activities of federal agencies responsible for reviewing biotechnology research and its
products. Sec Found, on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Stipp. 753, 754, 768-69 (D.D.C.
1984), afp in part & vacated in part by 756 F.2d 143 {D.C. Cir. 1985).
r Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed.
Reg. 50,856 (proposed Dec. 31, 1984).
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that "existing statutes seem adequate to deal with the emerging proc-
esses and products of [genetic engineering] . m18 Ultimately, the Coor-
dinated Framework sketched broad outlines of the jurisdiction of ex-
isting regulatory agencies over GM products.
The agency assignments outlined were consistent with existing
federal exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, FDA was to have responsibility
for regulating food and feeds modified via genetic engineering.
USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") would
regulate importation, interstate movement, and environmental re-
lease of transgenic plants with an aim of protecting existing crops
from hazards. 18 APHIS thus had the responsibility for issuing the li-
censes for field testing of food crops prior to commercial release. Fi-
lially, the EPA would register certain pesticide products in transgenic
plants prior to their distribution and sale and would establish pesti-
cide tolerances for residues in foods. 20
The federal government21 outlined the division of responsibilities
as follows:
Agency	 Products Regulated	 Reviews for Safety
FDA	 Food, feed, food additives, veterinary drugs 	 Safe to eat
USDA	 Plant pests, plants, veterinary biologic 22	Safe to grow
EPA	 Microbial/plant-pesticides, new uses of ex- Safe for the environment, safe
isting pesticides, novel microorganisms	 new use of a companion herbi-
cide
Following the publication of the Coordinated Framework, the
federal agencies and the White House continued to work together on
the specifics of how this division of authority would be exercised. The
Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee ("BSCC"), an inter-
agency committee responsible for coordination of science policy, be-
gan working together with the agencies and the OSTP to define the
la Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302
(proposed June 26, 1986).
19 Id.
20 For a good review of this early period of regulation, see generally Thomas O.
McGarity, Federal Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnologies, 20 U. Micn. J.L. REFORM 1089
(1987).
21 See USDA, Regulatory Oversight in Biotechnology, Responsible Agencies, at http://
www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech/OECD/usregs.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2003).
22 A biologic is any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood
component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product, applicable to the pre-
vention, treatment, or cure of diseases or injuries to humans. Animal Virus, Serum and
Toxin Act of 1913, 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (2000) (amended 1985).
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scope of organisms that would be subject to—and exempt from—fed-
eral biotechnology oversight. The BSCC, however, was ultimately un-
able to reach consensus on this issue.° The White House OSTP thus
took the BSCC's working materials and forwarded them to the Presi-
dent's Council on Competitiveness, a group formed by the Bush Ad-
ministration and led by Vice President Dan Quayle to promote U.S.
industry. The Council on Competitiveness then established an Ad
Hoc Committee on Scope. This group ultimately became responsible
for defining the scope of federal biotechnology responsibility and in-
cluded representatives of federal departments as well as other indi-
viduals. 24
As part of this effort, the Bush Administration's OSTP released a
draft policy statement on GM foods titled "Exercise of Federal Over-
sight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned Introductions of
Biotechnology Products into the Environment" ("Proposed Scope")
in 1992.25
 The document was to provide ongoing direction to federal
agencies on the implementation of federal policy as outlined in the
Coordinated Framework. It specifically stated that federal oversight
under the Coordinated Framework should be limited to science-based
risk assessment to "ensure the safety of planned introductions of or-
ganisms into the environment while not unduly inhibiting these in-
troductions."26
 In another document, "Four Principles of Regulatory
Review for Biotechnology" ("Principles of Regulatory Review"), the
Bush Administration re-emphasized that the end product would be
the focus of regulatory attention: Federal regulatory oversight should
focus on the characteristics and risks of the biotechnology product—
not the process by which it is created.
The stated rationale for this approach tied into the Administra-
tion's perspective on risk: "[P] roducts developed through biotech-
nology processes do not per se pose risks to human health and the en-
vironment; risk depends instead on the characteristics and use of the
KIUNISKY, supra note 10, at 197, 204.
24
 Principles for Federal Oversight of Biotechnology: Planned Introduction Into the
Environment of Organisms With Modified Hereditary Traits, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,118 (pro-
posed July 31, 1990) [hereinafter Principles for Federal Oversight].
26
 Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned Intro-
ductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment. 57 Fed. Reg. 6753 (proposed
Feb. 27, 1992) [hereinafter Exercise of Federal Oversight].
26
 Principles for Federal Oversight, supra note 24. The final statement of principles was
issued in Exercise of Federal Oversight, supra note 25, after a consideration of the com-
ments. The final document retains and strengthens the fundamental risk-based approach
articulated in the Proposed Scope document.
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individual products." 27 The Principles of Regulatory Review goes on
to outline the intended result of the government's approach. Thus,
Principle Two states that when review is deemed necessary it should
be "designed to minimize regulatory burden while assuring protec-
tion of public health and welfare."28
 Principle Three directs the gov-
eminent to "accommodate the rapid advances in biotechnology."28
In a separate iteration of the risk-based approach, the President's
Council on Competitiveness published the "Report on National Bio-
technology Policy" ("Report") in February 1991. The Report charac-
terized federal agencies as "gatekeepers" to the development and use
of biotechnology. The document specified that in order to not inhibit
growth, the government should presume that a product poses a
minimal risk in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. On this
basis the document indicated "[that the Administration would seek]
to eliminate unneeded regulatory burdens on all phases of the devel-
opment of new biotechnology products—laboratory and field ex-
periments, products development, and eventual sales and use." 30 Ul-
timately, the Report went even further than prior statements
regarding the minimal risks associated with GM technology by stating
that the federal government should only implement new regulations
on biotechnology for "those limited instances where private markets
fail to provide adequate incentives to avoid unreasonable risks to
health and the environment." 31
 According to a news report, Vice
President Dan Quayle even promised the industry that the new policy
was designed to provide regulatory relief for the fledgling industry so
that it would remain a world leader."
In 1992, the Bush Administration's OSTP completed its delibera-
tions on appropriate agency approaches to GM technology and pub-
lished a Final Statement of Scope. This document reiterated the fed-
eral approach to regulation: "oversight will be exercised only where
the risk posed by the introduction is unreasonable ... when the value
of the reduction in risk obtained by additional oversight is greater
than the cost thereby imposed." 33
 This document also explained that
27 Exercise of Federal Oversight, supra note 25, at 6760.
29 Id.
29 Id.
SQ PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTF,CHNOL-
OGY Poucy 11 (1991).
si Id.
32
 Warren E. Leary, Cornucopia of New Foods Is Seen as Policy on Engineering Is Eased, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1992, at A16.
" Exercise of Federal Oversight, supra note 25. at 6756.
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this approach to risk was chosen because it "is scientifically sound,
properly protects public health and the environment against risk, and
avoids hindering safe innovations."34
The scientific principles outlined in the Final Statement of Scope
are the clearest statement of the Administration's tenets on GM foods.
The five policy principles listed are:
1. The same physical and biological laws govern the re-
sponse of organisms modified by modern molecular and cel-
lular methods and those produced by classical methods;
2. Information about the process used to produce a GM or-
ganism is	 not a useful criterion for determining whether
the product requires less or more oversight;
3. No conceptual distinction exists between genetic
modification of plants and microorganisms by classical
methods or by molecular techniques... ;
4. Crops modified by molecular and cellular methods
should pose risks no different from those modified by classi-
cal methods for similar traits ... ; and
5. In many respects, molecular methods resemble the classi-
cal methods for modifying particular strains of microorgan-
ism, but [are even more useful than the classical methods.] 35
Neither the Final Statement on Scope nor the other documents out-
lines how to determine when measurable risks are present ("the scope
principles do not dictate precisely how information on risk should be
evaluated").36 It was left to the agencies to implement these policy
principles and to determine the degree of uncertainty acceptable un-
der the Administration directives.
Although Administration policy statements have no formal
authority over regulatory actions, they are important as guiding prin-
ciples for agencies. During the Reagan and Bush Administrations, the
three agencies involved were sympathetic to a pro-GM technology per-
spective. For example, Henry Miller, Commissioner of FDA during
34 Id. at 6755.
35 Id. This approach is sharply criticized by University of Minnesota ecologist Philip J.
Regal in articles available on his Web site, biosciamm.edu/—pregal/foodsafety.htm (last
visited May 14, 2003). In his articles, Professor Regal traces the history of his doubts about
the safety of GM foods and plants from a scientific perspective. Professor Regal's concerns
stem from the pleiotiopic effects that can result from gene insertions and lie maintains
that these concern were not and have not been adequately addressed by regulatory agen-
cies.
36 Exercise of Federal Oversight, supra note 25, at 6757.
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the Reagan Administration, was openly supportive of GM technolo-
gies and averse to imposing any unjustified government burden.
USDA was also eager to embrace the Administration's GM policies as
part of its mission to promote U.S. agriculture, including GM crops.
EPA was amenable as well, as its directive was simply to apply existing
pesticide law to GM products.
The fundamental adherence to this policy continued under the
Clinton Administration. By that time, the United States had estab-
lished itself as the world leader in the GM arena, and government
officials were eager to promote the U.S. position.
B. The Social Context
Perhaps as a result of the success of industry self-regulation of
rDNA, there was very little public discussion of GM products in the
1980s and early 1990s. With the exception of biotechnology gadfly
Jeremy Rifkin, consumer and environmental groups in the United
States paid very little attention to the technology at the time of its ini-
tial introduction into the U.S. market. 57 Certainly, a number of scien-
tists who participated in regulatory and international meetings on GM
technologies did raise concerns about allergenicity, toxicity', and envi-
ronmental issues. According to them, they trusted government scien-
tist and regulator assurances that the agencies were aware of the risks
and would ensure stringent safeguards."
Measurable public concern about the technology did not emerge
in the United States until the late 1990s—well after varieties of soy,
cotton, and corn had been introduced into American agriculture—
and only after the issue had become a political force in Europe. Emer-
gent opposition came from the agricultural sector, where there were
concerns about economic and health implications of GM technolo-
gies." In addition, natural food organizations began to take an inter-
est in the implications of the technology for healthy food and organic
37 See generally Patti S. Naik, Biotechnology Through the Eyes of an Opponent: The Resistance of
Activist Jeremy Rifkin, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2000); Interview by PBS with Jeremy Rifkin,
President, The Foundation on Economic Trends (Aug. 2000), at http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh / h arvest/ terviews/rifkin.html.
s8 See generally Philip Regal, Are Genetically Engineered Foods Safe? A Quest for Rio-
safety (1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cbs.umn.edu/—pregal/
foodsafety.h
39 Mothers for Natural Law, at http://www.safe-food.org  (last visited May 14, 2003);
The National Family Farm Coalition, Farmer to Farmer Campaign on Genetic Engineer-
ing, at littp://wwwmffc.net/bio4.htm (last visited May 14, 2003),
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products.° Environmental groups also began to raise questions about
long-term ecological and health consequences of GM products:"
Once focused on the issue, these voices became a force in agency
decision making and responses. As discussed in detail below, con-
sumer comments, petitions, and lawsuits have forced the agencies to
address safety and labeling issues, and to be responsive to consumer
and the public interest. Even in the face of such challenges, however,
U.S. regulators have remained largely faithful to the three policy ten-
ets laid out in the Coordinated Framework and associated Scope
documents. Moreover, opposition groups have not slowed the flow of
new products into the U.S. market. 42
The slow development of U.S. opposition to GM food and agri-
culture stands in marked contrast to the trajectory of the GM issue in
Europe. There, the technology was the focus of intense public opposi-
tion even before it was introduced and the resulting debate has led to
a moratorium on the introduction of GM products and stringent
regulations on labeling. The reason for this difference has been much
discussed but remains unclear.°
Some hold that the threshold for European objection to a new
food technology was much lower because of the rash of food scares
there, including the Bovine spongiform encephelopathy ("BSE" or
"mad cow disease") epidemic, and issues with dioxin-tainted prod-
ucts.'" Others explain the European objection as a function of more
enduring ties between urban populations and agriculture and food
products. 45
 Still others rationalize that the response to GM technology
in Europe was simply an indirect route for rejecting American corpo-
40 See Judy Schultz, Genetically Altered Food Worries Consumers, CALGARY HERALD. Sept. 2,
1999, available at ht tp://www.gefoodalert.org/News/news.cfm?News_ID=604;
 Advocacy
Groups Launch Campaign Against Biotech Foods, CBC News, Sept. 8, 1999, available at
http://www.gefoodalert.org/News/news.cfm?NewsiD=592.
41 Alan Yonan, Jr. Environmentalists Escalate Fight Against Altered Crops, Dow JoNES, Aug.
26, 1999, available at http://www.gefoodalert.org/News/news.cfm?News_ID=526;
 Group
Encourages Consumer Support for U.S. Ban on Genetically Altered Food, Daily Rep. Executives
(BNA) (Sept. 1, 1999), available at http://www.gefoodalert.org/News/news.cfm?News_ID
=559.
42
 On September 5, 2002, Monsanto announced a new line of GM corn. See Fierce Bio-
tech: the Biotech Industry's Daily Monitor, at http://www.fiercebiotech.com
 (last visited
May 14, 2003).
43 See, Lisette Alvarez, Consumers in Europe Reisist Gene Altered Foods, NA. TIMES, Feb. 11.
2003, at A3.
" George Gaskell et al., Worlds Apart? The Reception of Genetically Modified Foods in Europe
and the U.S., 285 SCIENCE 384 (1999).
45 See generally Echols, supra note 6.
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rate arrogance.46
 Another view is that politicians with strong views on
the propriety of GM technologies were able to find a voice in Euro-
pean governments as a result of the system of proportional represen-
tation, whereas such voices have been largely muted in the U.S. first-
past-the-post political system. 47
 It is likely that all of these factors are
contributors to the distinct European reaction to GM technology.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY
The following sections outline the development of FDA, USDA
and EPA regulation of GM products, and the impact of social criticism
and international conflict on government positions. Following the
Coordinated Framework and associated documents, each agency ar-
ticulated a position encompassing the three tenets of U.S. policy. In
this sense, each announced that existing statutory frameworks were
adequate for regulation, emphasized the end-product rather than the
process of GM technology, and made clear that regulation would not
be made in the absence of measurable risks. As the technology has
gained greater presence, pressures on the agencies have caused an
evolution of these principles.
A. Food and Drug Administration
1. FDA's Framework for GM Products
FDA is the most central of the three agencies involved in over-
sight of GM products and is charged with ensuring the safety of hu-
man food and animal feeds. FDA's statutory framework for conven-
tional foods is based on the approach that, in the absence of
identifiable risks, a manufacturer may place a product on the market.
Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("MCA"), the
manufacturer bears responsibility for ensuring that a product is not
adulterated or misbranded. Consistent with the Coordinated Frame-
work, FDA applied this approach to GM foods.
In its initial informal statements following the publication of the
Coordinated Framework, FDA stated that the safety of foods pro-
duced by new biotechnology would be ensured under existing general
46
 Sec generally Chaia Heller, Fivm Scientific Risk to Payson Savoir-Faire: Peasant Expertise in
the French and Global Debate Over GM Cm/is, 11 SCE AS CULTURE 7 (2002).
47
 This perspective has been articulated by Edwin Levy, Fellow, W. Maurice Young Cen-
tre for Applied Ethics at the University of British Columbia.
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adulteration and food additive provisions of the FFDCA. The general
food safety provisions of the FFDCA state that a food is adulterated if
it "bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which
may render it injurious to.health."48
 There are no pre-market reviews
of approvals required of foods. Instead, manufacturers or distributors
bear the burden of ensuring that any finished food placed on the
market meets the safety levels implicit in the definition of adulterated
foods. FDA is authorized to seek sanctions against foods that do not
adhere to these standards through seizure, injunction, or criminal
prosecution.°
Novel ingredients or components of foods are subject to an addi-
tional layer of review. Ingredients added to conventional foods must
be approved as food additives or must be generally recognized as safe
("GRAS"). Under 21 U.S.C. § 321(s), a food additive is defined as a
substance, the use of which may "reasonably be expected to result,
directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component" or "otherwise af-
fecting the characteristics" of food. To gain approval of a substance as
a new food additive, a manufacturer must submit a petition contain-
ing substantial scientific evidence of safety according to the tenets set
out in 21 C.F.R. part 171. Before a food additive petition is approved,
the fundamental safety standard requires that there be "reasonable
certainty" that no harm will result from the proposed use of the addi-
tive. 5° The food additive approval process is very involved and must
include extensive toxicity and feeding studies.
Ingredients that are determined to be GRAS are implicitly rec-
ognized as an exception to the food additive category and are exempt
from the food additive petition process." GRAS ingredients include
those substances demonstrated to be generally recognized as safe
among the community of scientific experts knowledgeable about such
substances. The GRAS exclusion has the effect of allowing substances
for which there is widely available knowledge about safety to avoid the
lengthy food additive review process.
FDA did not initially offer any guidance to industry as to how this
framework would apply to GM products after the publication of the
Coordinated Framework. The statutory framework itself only allowed
a few alternatives. The substances added to (or altered in) food as a
49 Id. § 342(a) (1) (2000).
49 See id. §§ 331(b), 332, 333, 334.
69 21 C.F.R. § 170.3(i) (2003).
51 21 U.S.C. § 321(s).
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result of the GM process would be considered to be either food addi-
tives or GRAS. Thus, companies were faced with either submitting a
food additive petition for each new GM variety, or determining them
to be GRAS and therefore exempt from the food safety provisions.
In the aftermath of the Coordinated Framework, the agency re-
ceived numerous inquiries from industry, government, academia, and
the public for further information on which regulatory route would
be required for GM foods. 52 It was clear to all parties involved that this
determination would have substantial bearing on the cost of bringing
GM products to market. 53 In response to the inquiries, the agency is-
sued its "Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varie-
ties" ("1992 FDA Policy") to "clarify its interpretation of the [FFDCA]
with respect to human foods and animal feeds derived from new plant
varieties, including but not limited to plants developed by new meth-
ods of genetic modification."54
The 1992 FDA Policy had two purposes. First, it outlined the
agency's view that most GM products were presumed or likely to be
GRAS, and therefore not subject to food additive review. In addition,
it established a voluntary pre-market consultation process to reassure
companies and the public that the food supply was being safeguarded.
In internal documents, FDA made clear its intent to foster the bio-
technology industry while simultaneously taking steps to allay any
public concern about. safety. Thus, a memorandum from FDA Com-
missioner David Kessler, M.D., to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, dated March 20, 1992, states, "The approach and provisions
of the [1992 FDA Policy] are consistent with the general biotechnol-
ogy policy established by the Office of the President in the recently
published 'scope' document. It also responds to White House interest
in assuring the safe, speedy development of the U.S. biotechnology
industry. "55
An undated document titled "FDA Regulation of Food Products
Derived from Genetically-Altered Plants: Point to Consider" similarly
refers to the Final Statement on Scope in stating that "FDA's objec-
tives in regulating the food products of biotechnology should be to
assure safety and provide assurance to the public ... while avoiding
" Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984
(proposed May 29, 1992).
59 Id.
54 hi.
55 Memorandum from David Kessler, Commissioner of Food and Drtigs, to die Secre-
tary for Health and Human Services (Mar. 20, 1992).
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'unnecessary' regulatory processes i.e., ones that do not justify the re-
source burdens they place on FDA and industry?" The document
goes on to balance the options for industry oversight between "sat-
isfy[ing] the public that it is being protected" and "avoid[ing] the ap-
pearance of complete industry self-regulation." 67
Ultimately, the 1992 FDA Policy's GM definition facilitated the
view that the risks associated with the technology were no different
from those posed by traditionally produced foods. FDA explicitly posi-
tioned its policy in this context, stating that "genetic modification"
included the "alteration of the genotype of a plant using any tech-
nique, new or traditional" (hybridization, etc.): "'Modification' is used
in a broad context to mean the alteration in the composition of food
that results from adding,'deleting or changing hereditary traits, irre-
spective of the method."66 The agency re-emphasized that the ap-
proach was consistent with a product-based policy:
The method by which food is produced or developed may in
some cases help to understand the safety or nutritional char-
acteristics of the finished food. However, the key factors in
reviewing safety concerns should be the characteristics of the
food product, rather than the fact that the new methods are
used."
FDA observed that with a few modest exceptions, food derived from
new plant varieties—through traditional breeding techniques such as
hybridization—are not routinely subjected to scientific tests for
safety," and it proposed to treat genetically modified plants in the
same way. 61
The essence of the 1992 FDA Policy was its presumption that ge-
netic material inserted into existing plants was GRAS, 62 and its expec-
tation that most expression products would also be GRAS:
56 FDA Regulation of Food Products Derived from Genetically-Altered Plants: Points to
Consider, available at hitp://www.bio-integrity.org/FDAdocs/21  (last visited May 14, 2003).
57 Id.
66 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (proposed May 29, 1992).
50 Id. at 22,984-85.
60 Id. at 22,988.
61 Id. at 22,984. "The regulatory status of a food, irrespective of the method by which it
is developed, is dependent upon the objective characteristics of the food and the intended
use of the food." Id.
62 Id. at 22,990.
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When the substance present hi the food is one that is already
present at generally comparable or greater levels in currently
consumed foods, there is unlikely to be a safety question
sufficient to call into question the presumed GRAS status of
such naturally occurring substances and thus warrant formal
premarket review and approval by FDA .... [M] inor mo-
lecular variations that do not affect safety would not ordinar-
ily affect the GRAS status of the substances. 63
On its face, this presumption was logical." In explicitly stating. its
GRAS presumption, however, the approach was different than FDA's
approach to conventional food ingredients. There, the burden is al-
ways on the manufacturer, in the first instance, to establish that. any
altered ingredients remain GRAS (or are approved as food additives),
and that the food as a whole meets the statutory safety standard. In
this sense, prior to the introduction of GM foods, FDA had generally
taken a conservative approach, and repeatedly made clear that. com-
panies should not presume that an ingredient is GRAS simply because
it is present in the food supply in other countries or in different for-
mats.°
Even a component of food, such as phytosterols derived directly
from vegetable oil, are not presumed to be GRAS. Instead, the manu-
facturer must. demonstrate that the substance is GRAS at the levels
and in the form provided. Though most new hybrids of standard
fruits and vegetables will be determined to be GRAS by their produc-
ers, FDA has never issued a blanket presumption in this regard. Also,
in making its general safety presumption, FDA did not address the
issue of the complexity of the genome or the issue of unintended ef-
fects in modified foods.
In fact, FDA's GRAS presumption on GM foods is interesting be-
cause it is inconsistent with questions raised by some agency scientists
themselves as the policy was being developed. 66 These statements sug-
66 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,990 (proposed May 29, 1992).
64 It is also true, as FDA asserted, that all plants contain the nucleotides that comprise
genetic material, and therefore that it has historically been part of the diet. Id,
66 See, e.g., Warning Letter from John B. Foret, Director, Division of Programs and En-
forcement Policy, FDA, to Robert Ehrlich, President, Robert's American Gourmet ( Jan. 27,
2000); Warning Letter from John B. Foret, Director, Division of Programs and Enforce-
ment Policy, FDA, to John Bello, CEO, South Beach Beverage Company (Feb. 1, 2000)
(noting that ingredients such as chromium picolinate, lycopene, Echinacea, gingko hiloba,
guarani, St. John's Wort, and gotu kola are not GRAS for use in foods).
66 Comments of certain members of the FDA staff on the 1992 Policy were revealed
during the discovery process in Alliance for Bio-Integrity a Shalala, 116 F. Stipp. 2d 166
750	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 44:733
gest that even while the agency as a whole adopted the Administration
position, individual scientists questioned whether it corresponded ac-
curately to the data available. Although dissent amongst scientists is
not unusual, the comments made by agency scientists cast some doubt
on whether GM foods were indeed generally recognized as safe.
In one document, a scientist in FDA's Office of Compliance
communicated concerns about the agency's developing position to
the FDA Biotechnology Coordinator, James Maryanski. The docu-
ment questions equating GM products with traditional products, and
notes the absence of data from which to draw such conclusions:
I believe that there are at least two situations relative to this
document in which it is trying to fit a square peg into a
round hole. The first square peg into a round hole is that
the document is trying to force an ultimate conclusion that
there is no difference between foods modified by genetic
engineering and foods modified by traditional breeding
practices. This is because of the mandate to regulate the
product, not the process.. .. The second square peg in a
round hole is that the approach of at least part of the docu-
ment is to use a scientific analysis of the issues involved to
develop the policy statement. In the first place, are we asking
the scientific experts to generate the basis for this policy
statement in the absence of any data? In the second place, I
don't think that the scientific analysis as presented is corn-
plete. 67
Another agency scientist in FDA's Microbiology Group critiqued
a draft of the 1992 FDA Policy:
The unintended effects cannot be written off so easily by just
implying that they too occur in traditional breeding. There
is a profound difference between the types of unexpected ef-
fects from traditional breeding and genetic engineering
which is just glanced over in this document. This is not to say
(D.D.C. 2000). The Alliance for Bio-Integrity has since posted these documents on its NVeb
site. Alliance for Bio-Integrity, Key FDA Documents Revelaing (1) Hazards of Genetically
Engineered Foods and (2) Flaws with How Agency Made Its Policy, at http://www.bio-
integrity.org/lists.html
 (last visited May 14, 2003).
67
 Memorandum from Linda Kahl, FDA Compliance Officer, to James Maryanski, FDA
Biotechnology Coordinator (Jan. 8, 1992) (on file with author).
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that they are more dangerous, just quite different, and this
difference should be and is not addressed. 68
The author of this statement added that several aspects of gene inser-
tion "may be more hazardous" than traditional crossbreeding. Re-
garding the possible activation of "cryptic" pathways to generate un-
expected toxins, the scientist wrote, "This situation IS different than
that experienced by traditional breeding techniques." 69
The voluntary consultation program established by the 1992 FDA
Policy was designed as a safeguard against erroneous GRAS presump-
dons. It established a process in which manufacturers and developers
of GM food products had the opportunity to present data to the in-
dustry in a series of meetings prior to going to market. 79 FDA encour-
aged companies to participate in the program, given the novelty of
the technology and mutual interest in ensuring safe food. The policy,
however, was not mandatory, nor did it establish mandatory disclosure
of information regarding GM foods. The only part of the process that
would be transparent to the public was the letter that the agency sent
"not objecting" to the voluntary consultation.
As the consultation program was implemented, FDA issued
guidances on recommended information for a consultation. Thus, in
a 1997 FDA document., "Guidance on Consultation Procedures for
Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties," the agency outlined the
types of information that agency scientists would want to see in a con-
sultation proceeding. This list includes:
(1) the name of the food and the crop from which it is de-
rived;
(2) a description of the applications or uses of the food;
(3) information concerning the sources, identifies and func-
dons of introduced genetic material;
(4) information on the purpose or intended technical effect
of the modification and its expected .effect on the food;
68 FDA Memorandum On The Use Of Microorganisms And Plants As Whole Foods
(Nov, 4. 1991),
69 Id.
"According to FDA, the agency based its specific informational requests on the mate-
rial examined in the Calgene Flavr-Savr tomato review. Calgene genetically modified a
strain of tomato to reduce activity of a particular enzyme (polygalacturonase) that affects
softening of outer tissue during ripening. Because the genetically modified tomato had
less of this enzyme, it could remain longer on the vine prior to harvest, thereby enhancing
its tomato flavor. 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (proposed May 29, t992).
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(5) information concerning the identity and function of ex-
pression products encoded by the introduced genetic mate-
rial;
(6) information on any known or suspected allergen icity;
(7) information comparing the GM food to that of natural
or commonly consumed varieties;
(8) a discussion of whether potential for allergic response
has been altered by the genetic modification; and
(9) any other information that is relevant to the safety of the
GM food. 711
The consultation would then involve a meeting with the agency and
continued discussion on any outstanding issues.
Though the scope of information requested was broad, FDA's
ability to obtain data it wanted may have been less than satisfactory. In
January 2003, the Center for Science in the Public Interest ("CSPI")
released a report based on its review of fourteen FDA GM product
consultations obtained through a Freedom of Information Act re-
quest to the agency. 72According to CSPI, in six of the consultations,
FDA requested additional information, and in three of those cases,
the companies refused FDA's request. 73
 For example, CSPI states that
when Monsanto notified FDA of its intent to market two varieties of
insect-resistant corn, it included data to show that the nutritional con-
tent of both genetically modified grains was not affected. 74
 But for
one of the varieties, Monsanto did not submit nutrient data for the
rest of the corn plant, such as the stalks, which often go into animal
feed. 75
 When FDA requested that information, it was denied. 7° Ac-
cording to Monsanto, the information would have been supplied but
the company did not go forward with the product. 77
CSPI also claims that FDA overlooked factual and scientific errors
in documents that were submitted. For example, the developer of GM
tomatoes and cantaloupes, Agitope Inc., claimed the products posed
71 See FDA, Guidance on Consultation Procedures for Foods Derived from New Plant
Varieties (1997).
72 Sec generally DOUG GURIAN-SIIERMAN, HOLES IN THE BIOTECH SAFETY NET: FDA POI:
ICY DOES NOT ASSURE THE SAFETY or GENETICALLY ENGINEERED Rictus (2003), available
at littp://www.cspinet.orginew/pdf/fda_report_final,pdf,
73 See id. at ii, 4.
74 See id. at 4.
" See id. at 4, 5.
76 Sec id.
77 Leila Aboud, Modified-crop Makers Faulted on Saftty Data Sent to FDA, WALL ST. J., Jan.
7, 2003, at A3.
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little risk because humans were already naturally exposed to the pro-
tein they were engineered to make. 78 According to CSPI, however, the
scientific papers submitted to prove this point did not support it." A
company spokesperson said that. FDA never raised the issue and that
the product was dropped before going to market.8°
Through 2000, FDA processed approximately fifty consultations
under the 1992 FDA Policy with fairly minimal public attention. As
GM products assumed a greater presence on the market, however,
questions about their safety and proliferation became more frequent.
In part, this was probably due to the intense focus on the issue in
Europe. 81 The questions were also likely a response to the fact that by
1998, GM products represented thirty percent of the total soy acreage,
twenty percent of the corn acreage, and over twenty-five percent of
the cotton acreage in the United States. 82
By the late 1990s, public awareness of GM foods reached a critical
level and a number of public interest groups errierged to focus on the
issue. One of the early groups to focus on the issue was Mothers for
Natural Law ("MFNL"), an Iowa-based organization that aimed to ban
GM foods from the market. The group launched a national public
awareness campaign on genetically engineered foods in July 1996, 33 In
addition, it. promoted an "initiative to secure rigorous pre-market
safety testing, mandatory labeling and even a moratorium on these
foods. "84
MFNL's campaign painted the specter of unsafe, untested infant
formula and other family food products. Even now, the group's Web
site asks, "Is genetic engineering safe for you and your family? Safe for
the environment? Safe for the future of mankind? No long-term stud-
ies have been done. No one can answer these questions." 85 The group
goes on to state, "If we don't engage the support of our government
for serious caution, for rigorous safety testing, for a moratorium, ge-
78 	Slip? note 72.
78 Id.
88 Abotl, supra note 77, at A3.
81 See generally Echols, supra note 6 (discussing the different responses to novel food
technologies),
82 Peter A. Riley et al., U.S. Farmers arc Rapidly Adopting Biotech Crops, AGRIC. OU'ILOOK
(USDA, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1998, at 21, available at http://jan.rnantilib.cornelLedu/
reports/erssor/econornics/ao-bb/1998/ao253.pdf.
83 Mothers for Natural Law; About Mothers for Natural Law, at Intp://wwwsafe-
food.org/-campaign/about.hunl (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
84 Id.
88 Mothers for Natural Law, so pro note 39.
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netically engineered foods will become the norm, labeling will be re-
dundant and our children will live in a world where real food, natural
food, is no longer available." 88
 In 1998 and 1999, MFNL undertook a
grassroots petition drive to call for labeling of GM products and gen-
erated nearly 500,000 signatures, 87
 This petition was distributed
through health food stores, regional coordinators and on university
campuses, as well as tens of thousands of signature gatherers all over
the country.88
The Union of Concerned Scientists ("UCS"), an alliance of
60,000 citizens and scientists, has been another prominent voice on
the issue. 89
 UCS relies on its scientific expertise and publicly questions
the basis for FDA's regulatory process. UCS has urged FDA to require
safety testing—on the level of food additive petitions—prior to allow-
ing GM foods on the market and has also consistently urged the
agency to require labeling of its products. As the pace of GM products
entering the market increased in the 1990s, UCS became a vocal critic
of what it saw as the agency's collusion with industry and failure fully
to take account of allergenicity and other safety issues.
The Center for Food Safety ("CFS"), a public interest organiza-
tion dedicated to strict regulation of GM foods, organics, and other
novel technologies, is also a prominent voice on the issue. In 2000,
CFS filed a citizen petition with FDA outlining safety ,
 concerns associ-
ated with GM foods.° Signers of the CFS petition included a range of
NGOs, from environmental organizations to health food concerns to
representatives of traditional family farms. Collectively, the signers
accused FDA of a too permissive position on GM foods and asked that
the agency institute mandatory food additive petitions for these
products.
On the legislative front, the Campaign to Label Genetically Engi-
neered Foods became a persistent critic of FDA. The organization was
launched in March 1999 as a response to the "growing acreage of tin-
88




 Union for Concerned Scientists, About UCS, at http://www.ucsusa.org/ucs/aboin
(last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
9° Center for Food Safety, Citizen Petition Before the United States Food and Drug
Administration, Petition Seeking the Establishment of Mandatory Pre-Market Safety Test-
ing, Pm-Market Environmental Review, & Labeling for all Genetically Engineered Foods,
available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/Ii/BigFDAPetition9.html
 (last visited May
14, 2003).
20031	 Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified Food & Agriculture 	 755
labeled and inadequately tested genetically engineered crops." 91 The
group focuses on lobbying Congress and has been instrumental in
getting Congressman Dennis Kucinich, a Democrat from Ohio, to be-
come the primary sponsor of legislation that would require labeling
on GM foods.92 Kucinich also introduced legislation to require food
additive review for each GM product." If passed, this bill would
amend the FFDCA to include GM products in the definition of "food
additive."94 In addition, it would provide for citizen suits as a means of
consumer enforcement of the provision.
On May 27, 1998, FDA faced the strongest legal challenge over
the legitimacy of its 1992 policy to date. In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v.
Shalala, a group of concerned citizens sued the agency over its posi-
tion on GM foods. 95 The plaintiffs challenged FDA's presumption that
genetically modified foods should be considered safe unless they con-
tain substances that are allergens or change the character of the food.
The plaintiffs identified a range of secondary changes that could oc-
cur in products as a result of genetic modification, including un-
wanted, unpredictable new toxins and/or carcinogens or degradation
of nutritional quality.
The suit further claimed that in drafting the 1992 FDA Policy the
agency failed to abide by the public notice-and-comment procedures
of the Administrative Procedures Act, and that FDA's refusal to re-
quire labeling and safety testing for GM foods raised health and envi-
ronmental concerns. The suit identified thirty-six GM foods that were
likely being eaten by U.S. consumers without their knowledge." Ulti-
mately, the Alliance for Bio-Integrity plaintiffs asked the court to compel
the agency to carry out the same testing and safety evaluations con-
ducted for food additives under 21 U.S.C. § 409, and to require label-
ing of these foods on grounds that they had been "materially"
changed. 97
91 See The Campaign to Label Genetically Engineered Foods, About Us, at http://
www.thecampaign.org/aboutus.plip (last visited May 14, 2003).
92 The Genetically Engineered Foods Right to Know Act, H.R. 3377, 106th Cong.
(1999). A companion bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Boxer in 2000. See S.
2080, 106th Cong. (2000).
93 Genetically Engineered Food Safety Act, H.R. 4813, 107th Cong. (2002).
94 See generally id.
95 116 F. Stipp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000).
99
 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.
This act requires that federal laws or regulations not impede the free exercise of religion.
97 116 F. Stipp. 2d at 178. The debate over labeling is discussed further below.
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The U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia rejected each
of the plaintiffs' arguments and granted the government's motion for
summary judgement.98
 The court disagreed that the 1992 FDA Policy
had been improperly promulgated, and noted that a policy, as op-
posed to a formal agency action, is not subject to the notice-and-
comment requirements." On substantive issues, the court deferred to
FDA's presumption in its 1992 policy statement that GM foods are
GRAS. 1" The court noted that scientific applications of statutory law
were within FDA's expertise, and that well-established principles of
administrative law prevented the court from second-guessing the
agency.tot
The court was similarly deferential to FDA's judgement with re-
spect to labeling. The relevant statute states that FDA can take action
for the misbranding of a food if the labeling "fails to reveal facts .. .
material with respect to consequences which may result from use of
the article. "102 The court stated that FDA had determined that
changes to foods resulting from genetic modification were not "mate-
rial," and it therefore did not require labeling. 198
 The court declined
to challenge the agency's expert conclusion on the effects of GM on
foods.
Ultimately, this decision made clear that critics of FDA's policy
had very little legal ground on which to stand. The case, however, did
heighten public awareness of GM foods and added to the perception
that the government was not regulating these products. Even more,
documents released by FDA during the discovery process showed that
agency scientists themselves had doubts about the risk assessment
process and the government's position. 194
 The net result was to put
the issue in the spotlight and to force FDA to defend its policies more
publicly.
In light of the heightened focus on GM products, the agency an-
nounced a series of public hearings in 1999. 105
 These hearings were
98 Id. at 181.
99 Id. at 170, 172.
100 Id. at 177, 178.
1 ° 1 Id.
102 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2000).
103
 Alliance for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Stipp. 2d at 178.
104
 In dismissing the case, the court noted that the internal FDA dissent revealed by a
few of the estimated 44,000 pages of documents released was insufficient to lead the court
to challenge agency discretion. Id. at 177.
1°5
 Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, FDA Announces
Public Meetings on Bioengineered Foods (Oct. 18, 1999).
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held in Oakland, California, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. and at-
tracted a large amount of public attention. According to FDA's own
estimates, over 50,000 written comments were submitted to FDA in
the context of the hearings.'" The meetings were colorful affairs:
demonstrators gathered outside dressed in costumes with signs and
banners. Companies such as Monsanto were concerned enough about
the impact of the meetings that they bussed in GM supporters to
stand off against the demonstrators. Inside, the meetings were equally
lively. Most commentators represented consumers, the public interest,
or other anti-GM groups and articulated their comments in kind.'"
According to the agency's summary, comments revolved around
three major themes.'" The first, generally from representatives of in-
dustry, was that there was no information that raised questions about
the safety of GM foods then being marketed.'" The second focused
on whether FDA's current regulatory regime was adequate to ensure
safety given the range of unknowns."° The third focused on whether
labeling GM products should be required,'"
In January 2001, FDA responded to the comments by proposing
a new rule that would requite manufacturers of "plant-derived, bioen-
gineered foods and animal feeds" (GM foods) to notify FDA at least
120 days before the products are marketed in a "Premarket Biotech-
nology Notice" ("PBN"). 112 In essence, FDA's proposed rule would
make the 1992 voluntary consultation process mandatory." 3
 FDA was
careful to state that its proposal did not reflect any new safety con-
cerns about the products." 4 The agency characterized the proposed
rule as simply a proactive measure to ensure that FDA stayed current
106 Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA, Guidance for Industry: Volun-
tary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or have Not Been Developed Using Bioen-
gineering (Jan. 2001) (draft) [hereinafter Guidance for Industry], availabk at http://vm.
cfsan.fda ,gov/—tims/biolabgn.li
"'Sec FDA Transcripts of Public Meetings on Bioengineered Foods (on file with FDA).
For more information on the meetings, see generally Intp://wwwida.govioc/biotech/
default.htm (last visited May 14, 2003).
108 Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4708 (pro-




113 Id. at 4707.
113 66 Fed. Reg. at 4707.
114
 Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed, Reg, 4706, 4709 (pro-
posed Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592).
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with developing technology as GM products became more widespread
and complex. FDA restated its belief that GM products are safe.' 15
In justifying its proposal, FDA stated that as the pace of develop-
ment of GM products increased, it made sense for the agency to en-
sure that it retained "the opportunity to discuss safety and other regula-
tory issues ... before new hioengineered foods go on the market." 116
The PBN rule would require the submission of data and information
about the substance, as well as a narrative interpretation of this in-
formation.'" To satisfy the public demand for information, FDA
stated that it would make the existence of the PBN, as well as the
agency's evaluation and response to the notice, accessible to the pub-
lic, though any informal consultations with the agency would be kept
confidential. 118
The proposal met with mixed reviews. Companies involved in the
production of GM foods applauded the agency for making its prog-
ress more rigorous and confirming to the outside world that GM
products were tightly regulated by the agency. Critics of the agency
were less generous. While many congratulated FDA for making the
process mandatory, critics complained that the process was not trans-
parent enough and that FDA had still failed to articulate clear stan-
dards on what would need to be shown for the agency to not object to
a product. 119
 Moreover, critics maintained that by continuing to rely
on a presumption that GM foods were GRAS, the agency was essen-
tially giving a wide range of products free reign, without investigating
how small changes in plant genetic matter can have unexpected ef-
fects. Critics reiterated their view that nothing short of holding these
products to a food additive review standard would satisfy them that
FDA was adequately protecting the public. 120
 Despite the continued
support of industry for the proposal, FDA has not yet finalized the
rule. 121
116
115 Id. (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 4725.
115 Id. Specifically, FDA states that it will publish the fact of the notification and the
agency's response in an accessible place. To obtain copies of the actual submissions, how-
ever, minus confidential information, a Freedom of Information request would need to be
filed.
119 Sec Consumers Union, Consumers Union Comments on Docket No. 00N-1396,




 Industry Presses FDA for Preinathet Biotech Notification, Foot.) CHEM. NEWS, Dec. 5,
2002, at 5.
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2. Labeling
FDA's perspective on labeling also reflects its embrace of a prod-
uct-based, rather than process-based approach. To date, the agency
has declined to require mandatory labeling of GM products. More-
over, FDA permits voluntary labeling of GM products only if such
statements are carefully structured to avoid "misleading" consumers
into the belief that such products differ in any material way from their
conventionally produced counterparts.
The foundations of FDA's labeling policy are (1) 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(a) (1), which states that a food is misbranded if "its labeling is
false or misleading in any particular;" and (2) 21 U.S.C. § 321(n),
which states that labeling is misleading if it "fails to reveal all facts that
are material in light of such representations or material with respect
to consequences which may result from the use of the article to which
the labeling relates." Ultimately, the statutory language makes clear
that labeling which omits material facts may be deemed misleading by
FDA, and thereby subject to enforcement action.
Neither the statute nor the legislative history of the FFDCA offers
any further explication of when information is material for purposes
of labeling, or when information can or cannot be required. In the
past, FDA has interpreted these sections of the FFDCA to require spe-
cial labeling in cases where the absence of such information may
(1) pose health or environmental risks (e.g., a warning on
protein products used in very low calorie diets);
(2) mislead the consumer in light of other statements on the
label (e.g., requirement for quantitative nutrient information
when certain nutrient content claims (i.e. low calorie) are
made about a product.); or
(3) mislead the consumer to assume that because of its simi-
larity to another food, a product has certain specific nutri-
tional characteristics. 122
In FDA's opinion, none of these scenarios apply to the GM con-
text. Indeed, under its product-based approach, FDA takes the posi-
tion that GM food is "substantially similar" to its conventional coun-
terpart, and therefore there are no material differences that could
t22 See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th
Cong. (Sept. 26, 2000) (statement of Joseph A. Levitt, Director, Center for Food Safety and
Applied Nutrition), available at littp://vin.cfsan.fda.gov/—Ird/stbioeng.html.
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form the basis of special labeling.'" Based on this position, the 1992
FDA Policy specifically states that any labeling that a food is "GM-free"
or "GMO-free" would be considered misleading under 21 U.S.C. §
343. 124
 FDA has further stated that there is no precedent for requiring
disclosure of a manufacturing process based simply on consumer de-
sire to know. 125
Even as the agency articulated this policy and published it in a
policy statement in 1995, 126
 consumer demand for labeling was grow-
ing. A consumer survey conducted in 1997 by Novartis found that
ninety-three percent of Americans wanted FDA to require labeling of
genetically engineered foods. 127
 In addition, a Time Magazine poll
conducted in 1999 found that eighty-one percent of those polled
wanted bioengineered foods to be labeled. A poll conducted by the
Center for Science in the Public Interest in 2001 helps put the inten-
sity of consumer desire into context. In that poll, for example, sixty-
two percent of those surveyed agreed that labels should include in-
formation on whether ingredients came from GM crops. Within the
context of attributes that could or should be disclosed (e.g., pesticide
use, use of plant hormones), the fact of being genetically engineered
was deemed the second most important piece of information, after
use of pesticides. Those surveyed also indicated that labeling was most
important if the whole food (e.g., a tomato) was modified, slightly less
important if a major ingredient (e.g., the wheat in Wheaties) was
modified, and still less important if a minor ingredient in a processed
food was modified.'"
125 FDA requires special labeling for foods if they pose special safety or usage issues. In
the example FDA often gives, if a food had a new protein introduced into it to which peo-
ple were allergic, FDA would require the label to reveal that information. In its 1992 policy
statement, the agency noted that labeling would be required if genes were introduced
from foods that were commonly allergenic, unless the developer could scientifically dem-
onstrate that the protein was not responsible for the allergenicity of the original foods.
124
 Food Labeling: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,837 (pro-
posed Apr. 28, 1993). Note that FDA issued a new policy on the use of these terms in 2001,
as discussed below.
125 The court in Alliance for Bio-Integrity supported this position.
126
 CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, FDA, FDA's POLICY FOR FOODS DE-




 The Center for Food Safety, Citizen Petition Before the United States Food and
Drug Administration (2000) (received Mar. 21, 2000).
128
 Center for Science in the Public Interest, National Opinion Poll on Labeling of
Genetically Modified Foods (Mar. 30—Apr. 1, 2001), at http://www.cspinet.org/new/
poll_gefoods.html. The CSPI survey also revealed a certain amount of confusion or am-
bivalence about the GM process. For example, equal numbers stated that they would buy
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During the public meetings that FDA held in 1999, a large num-
ber of the more than 50,000 written comments received by the agency
related to labeling.' According to the agency, most of those com-
ments requested mandatory disclosure of the fact that a food or its
ingredients was GM or was produced from GM foods)" The rationale
for such comments varied and included the desire to safeguard the
purity of the food, prevent potential allergic reactions, avoid a process
that interferes with religion or moral views, and promOte traditional
farming. In addition, many of the comments expressed concern
about possible long-term consequences from unknowingly consuming
GM food."'
In response to the 1999 meetings and public concerns, FDA pub-
lished "Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating
Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengi-
neering," explaining its position and outlining the parameters for
voluntary labeling of GM foods. 132 In this document, FDA reaffirmed
the position that most. GM foods were substantially equivalent to their
conventional counterparts. The agency also made clear that the proc-
ess of genetic modification was not itself a material difference in the
food:
The agency is still not. aware of any data or other informa-
tion that would form a basis for concluding that the fact that
a food or its ingredients was produced using bioengineering
is a material fact that must be disclosed under sections
403(a) [343(a)] and 201(n) [321(n)] of the act. FDA is
therefore reaffirming its decision to not require special la-
beling of all bioengineered foods. 133
The agency went on to suggest that because of the strongly divergent
views on labeling, manufacturers could consider providing more in-
formation about GM foods as long as this information was "truthful
and not misleading." 134 The agency reiterated that, in its view, state-
ments such as "GM free" or "biotech free" were potentially "false and
GM fruits or vegetables (or processed foods) as those who stated they would buy products
made from cross-bred corn. Fifty-five percent of those surveyed stated that they were not
very familiar or not at all familiar with GM foods.





194 Guidance for Industry, supra note 106.
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misleading," based on the fact that (1) there are no established
threshold levels of bioengineered constituents or ingredients in foods,
and (2) there is no evidence that GM foods are inferior in any way to
their conventional counterparts.'"
Ultimately, FDA did acknowledge a limited role for labeling in
the context of GM foods. Labeling would be mandatory if a GM
product differed from its conventional counterpart so that the com-
mon or usual 'name of the item no longer applied; for example, if a
GM soybean oil no longer had the same nutritional or functional
properties as non-GM soybean oil. FDA also acknowledged that if the
product differed in safety (i.e. allergenicity) profile, labeling would be
required.'"
In addition, FDA identified the range of voluntary labeling
statements that manufacturers could use. These include: "This prod-
uct contains cornmeal that was produced using biotechnology;"
"These tomatoes were genetically engineered to improve texture;" or
"Some of our growers plant tomato seeds that were developed
through biotechnology to increase crop yield."' 37 For FDA, these
statements are not misleading because they are informative without
implying that GM foods are better or worse than conventional foods.
Critics of this latest policy statement have called it disingenuous.
They point to the proposed labeling of irradiated foods as an example
of providing process-based label information to consumers. FDA ap-
proved the use of irradiation on certain foodstuffs based on its con-
clusion that this form of processing does not result in any material
difference in the foods. Despite this, FDA requires disclosure that this
process has been used on labels of treated foods.'" In its rule making
on the subject, FDA stated:
136 Id. It is worth noting that FDA identified the term "genetically modified" itself as
confusing and potentially misleading. According to the agency, genetic modification oc-
curs in all plants regardless of human agency and the goal of traditional plant breeding is
genetic modification. FDA concludes that
while it is accurate to say that a bioengineered food was "genetically
modified," it likely would be inaccurate to state that a food that had not been
produced using biotechnology was "not genetically modified" without clearly






 FDA's position may be overturned. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002. H.R. 2646, 107th Cong., directed FDA to review its labeling regulation for irradiated
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[I]n the absence of a statement that a food has been irradi-
ated, the implied representation to consmners is that the
food has not been processed .... Whether information is
material under [321(n)] ... depends not on the abstract
worth of the information but on whether consumers view
such information as important and whether the omission of
label information may mislead a consumer. 139
Supporters of GM food labeling point to this reasoning as analo-
gous to their own request and have questioned repeatedly why it does
not apply in the GM context. These critics take the view that the ab-
sence of an affirmative statement that a food had been genetically
modified would be viewed as an implied representation to consumers
that it has been grown by traditional. means. Despite the logic of this
position, FDA has not explained the seemingly inconsistent reason-
ing.
Despite the criticism and repeated calls for mandatory labeling,
FDA's approach to GM labeling has been upheld by the courts. In Al-
liance for Bio-Intepity, one of the key plaintiff demands was that FDA
institute mandatory labeling of GM foods on grounds that genetic
alteration made material changes (i.e. safety, allergenicity risks) to
foods, meriting labeling. Plaintiffs took the position that the process
of being genetically modified was itself a material fact. As noted, how-
ever, the court rejected both of these arguments and affirmed FDA's
position. In a manner seemingly inconsistent with the irradiated-food
labeling regulations, the court stated that consumer demand itself was
not a basis for mandatory labeling. 144
food, and until the review is done, to allow companies to seek permission to change the
labeling for specific irradiated products. Companies are seeking to use language less
alarming to consumers, such as "Cold Pasteurized," These proposals remain controversial.
199
 Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg.
13,376 (Apr. 18, 1986) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 179). For further discussion, see
Frederick Degnan, Food Labeling and the Right-to-Know, 52 Foon & Mum; LT 49 (1997).
145 Alliance for Rio-Integrity. 116 F. Stipp. 2d at 178. Courts have also taken this position
in cases dealing with the related issue of mandatory labeling for milk produced from cows
treated with recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone ("rBGH"). a bioengineered version of
growth hormone injected into cows to increase the rate of lactation. The first such case.
Staube• v. Shaleda, 895 F. Stipp. 1178 (W.D. Wis. 1995). involved a challenge to FDA's de-
termination that it would not require labeling disclosing that dairy products came from
rBGH-treated cows. The court granted summary judgement against the plaintiffs on this
point, deferring instead to FDA's finding that there was no difference between dairy prod-
ucts from rBGH-treated or non-treated cows. Id. at 1193.
The second case, International Dairy Foods Ass'n u Arocstoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996), in-
volved an industry challenge to a Vermont law mandating disclosure of rBGH use in the
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3. Containment
The issue of containment poses the latest challenge to FDA, and
may result in the agency having to move away from its product-based
approach and perhaps even reliance on existing statutory law. Con-
tainment refers to the effort to contain GM plants/seeds from cross-
fertilizing neighboring crops or contaminating non-GM foods. From
the first discussions of GM foods, scientists have pointed to the poten-
tial risks from altered genomes spreading into other plants and the
environment. FDA has not, however, explicitly addressed the issue or
to what degree contamination of food products by unapproved GM
products will be tolerated. Nonetheless, contamination issues are oc-
curring with greater frequency both in the United States and interna-
tionally, and it appears that FDA is on the verge of issuing a guidance
document on the subject.
At present, FDA reviews GM products that are intended for food
uses only under its consultation program. Containment issues could
mean that the agency would need to consider potential food presence
of GM products that were not intended for use as foods. As such, the
agency would be forced to move beyond its product-based approach.
The questions posed by containment became a reality for FDA in
April 2002, when Monsanto notified FDA that a GM canola oil mar-
keted by the company could potentially be contaminated with small
amounts of a different strain of GM canola oil that had not been sub-
ject to agency review for food uses.l"t According to news reports,
Monsanto sent the FDA a letter detailing the possibility of contamina-
tion of its RT73 canola oill 42 with the unreviewed GT 2000 strain, in
order . to avoid legal challenges and recalls of the type experienced
following the StarLink crisis. In discussing the incident with Wall
production of milk. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down the
Vermont law on grounds that "consumer curiosity" was not "substantial" enough to justify
the intrusion on commercial free speech under the First Amendment. Id. at 74.
For further discussion of rBCH and these cases, see Emily Maiden, Recombinant Bovine
Growth Hormone and the Courts: In Search offustice, 46 DRAKE: L. Ray. 617 (1998).
141 Scott Kilman Sr Jill Carroll, Leading the News: Monsanto Admits Unapproved Seed illay
Be in Crops, WALL s-r. j., Apr. 15, 2002, at Al
112 Monsanto's RT73 Canola Oil was submitted for review tinder the agency's 1992
notification policy on April 5, 1995. On September 26, 1995, FDA responded that it had no
objection to Monsanto's conclusion that this product was not materially different in corn.
position, safety or any other relevant parameter from canola varieties currently on the
market and it would not raise issues that would require premarket review or approval by
FDA." Letter from Alan M. Rul is, Ph.D.. Director. Office of Premarket Approval. Center for
Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, to Monsanto Company (Sept. 26, 1995).
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Street Journal reporter Michael Phillips, an industry observer ac-
knowledged, "As we see more and more varieties come out ... you
might find trace amounts [of bioengineered ingredients] in food that
didn't go through the full regulatory measure." 143
In this instance, FDA opted to address Monsanto's problem
within the confines of its consultation program. That is, the agency
decided to interpret Monsanto's letter as a voluntary consultation on
the unreviewed strain of canola, even though it was not clear that the
variety was intended for human food uses. On April 16, 2002, a news
source announced that FDA was "[nearing completion] of its volun-
tary review of the canola" and said it would be sending Monsanto a
letter stating the canola is "safe to eat and will not require mandatory
FDA approval to be sold.""4
FDA was able to fit the second canola strain in its existing frame-
work only because Monsanto detected the contamination and
brought safety information to FDA's attention. In drafting its 2001
proposed rule, however, FDA recognized that most contamination
challenges would not be detected before they were a part of the food
supply. In the proposed rule, FDA therefore urged companies devel-
oping non-food GM products to consult with the agency in the expec-
tation that contamination would or could result." 5 FDA's aim is to
preclude the chance of a contamination crisis, where unreviewed
products enter the food supply and the agency has no information
about. their safety.
More recently, a notice published by the OSTP directed FDA, as
well as EPA and USDA, to outline specific containment policies. This
August 2, 2002 publication, "Proposed Federal Actions to Update
Field Test Requirements for Biotechnology Derived Plants and To Es-
tablish Early Food Safety Assessments for New Proteins Produced by
143 Kaman & Carroll. supra note 141 (quoting Michael P. Phillips of the Biotechnology
Industry Organization, an industry trade group).
1 " Jill Carroll, FDA Says Monsanto Cana(' Doesn't Appear to Pose Risks, WALL. Sr. J., Apr.
16, 2002.
1415 Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4714 (pro.
posed Jan, 18. 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pis, 192, 592). FDA states that it
encourages developers of [GM products] that are not intended for use in
food or feed, but that theoretically could enter the food or feed supply, to
participate in the consultation program described .... This participation
would ensure that developers have given careful consideration to the proce-
dures needed to ensure that their products do not inappropriately get into
the food supply, and are aware of the legal implications if their products do.
Id.
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Such Plants,"146
 acknowledges that as the number of new GM agricul-
tural products being tested increases, there is a likelihood that small
amounts of these new products will contaminate existing crops."' The
notice states, "This could result in intermittent, low levels of biotech-
nology-derived genes, and gene products occurring in commerce that
have not gone through all applicable regulatory reviews."148
 In re-
sponse, OSTP states that each of the three relevant regulatory agen-
cies will issue guidances and/or update regulations to reflect the real-
ity of GM contamination.
With respect to FDA, the notice states that the agency will issue a
guidance establishing procedures under which developers may pro-
vide FDA with safety information on GM foods/feeds that have not
previously been evaluated by FDA and are new to the food crop into
which they are engineered." 9
 As suggested by the proposed rule, FDA
is to review GM crops that are not intended for food uses because such
products may enter the food supply through cross fertilization or
other contamination. The notice directs FDA to review this additional
information to assess potential toxicity and allergenicity, to ensure
food safety even if there are containment problems. 150
 Consistent with
existing practices, FDA would issue a written response after any con-
sultations and post this information on its Web site. 151
If FDA issues such a guidance, it will be a marked step away from
its product-based approach. Indeed, FDA will be in the position of
reviewing all new crops for GRAS status based solely on the process by
which they have been developed. Further, such reviews would stretch
the traditional interpretation of the applicable statutes. Under 21




 Id. at 50,579
15° Id.
" 1
 Containment is also becoming more prominent as plants producing pharmaceuti-
cals become a reality. The risk is that ordinary food crops could be contaminated with
pharmaceuticals. FDA and USDA recently issued a draft guidance on this issue. USDA &
FDA, Guidance for Industry: Drug, Biologics, and Medical Devices Derived from Bioengi-
'leered Plants for Use in Humans and Animals (Sept. 2002) (draft), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/bioplant.htm . An example of the risk was revealed when
regulators discovered that a biotech corn variety engineered to produce an experimental
type of insulin had contaminated a neighboring soybean field in Nebraska. The responsi-
ble company, ProdiGene, a Texas-based biotechnology company, has since been fined by
the authorities. Press Release, USDA, USDA Investigates Biotech Company for Possible
Permit Violations (Nov. 13, 2002), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/news/
2002/11/prodigene.html.
20031	 Regulatory Policy on Genetically Afodified Food & Agriculture 	 767
U.S.C. § 348, only ingredients intended for food uses are subject to the
food additive or GRAS safety review. As outlined by OSTP, however,
FDA would essentially be applying its GRAS review to all GM products,
regardless of whether or not they are intended to be used as human
or animal foods.
Industry touted the OSTP move as further indicative of the will
of government to protect the public. The New York Times reported
the Biotechnology Industry Organization as welcoming the new pro-
posals: "For consumers, this enhancement adds yet another layer of
assurance to the existing regulatory review of agricultural crops."'"
Critics have maintained that the containment issue is far greater than
the government acknowledges and warn that contamination could
result in unsafe foods, or even unintended pharmaceuticals, in daily
products. 153
B. U.S. Department of Agriculture
Both USDA and EPA share significant authority over GM foods
with FDA. Like FDA, each of these agencies focuses its policies on the
three-part approach developed by the White House and OSTP. Yet,
USDA and EPA have responded to the three regulatory principles in
different ways. Thus, although USDA explicitly stated that it agreed
that existing statutory frameworks and risk-based regulation were pri-
orities, it initially took a more precautionary approach to the tech-
nology. It extended its pre-introduction permit requirement to any
GM product. that was deemed to have the potential to spread or cause
injury in other plants. Only after several years of experience did
USDA conform to OSTP policy and presume minimal levels of risk.
EPA, in contrast, has remained largely consistent in its approach.
EPA made clear that the relevant statutory framework was written
broadly enough to include GM products, and that its existing product-
based approach would apply. In recent years, this perspective has
been subject to criticism in response to growing concerns that EPA
has not fully considered environmental risks and lacks the capacity to
monitor them.
152 Andrew Pollack, Earlier Safety Reviews Proposed for Gene-Altered Crops, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
2, 2002, at C3.
155 See, e.g., The Campaign to Label Genetically Engineered Foods, GMO Contamina-
tion, at Intp://wvnv.thecampaign.orgianalysis/analysis100501.htm (last visited May 14.
2003),
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The Coordinated Framework directed USDA to oversee the in-
troduction of GM plants into agriculture as well as the transport of
such products around the United States. In response, USDA stated
that such oversight would be conducted under the then existing stat-
ute, the Federal Plant Pest Act ("FPPA"), 151 which directed the agency
to monitor the introduction and transport of new agricultural organ-
isms. The FPPA specifically empowered USDA to regulate imports and
the movement of items deemed to be "plant pests" (e.g., microorgan-
isms, plants, or insects) and authorized USDA to seize, quarantine,
destroy, or apply other remedial measures to articles that infested or
were infected by or contained a plant pest. 155 The aim was to maintain
the health and sustainability of U.S. agriculture. Before the arrival of
GM products, USDA had used this authority to establish a permit re-
gime for the introduction of all organisms that could potentially in-
jure or cause disease or damage in any plants.''°
In a sharp divergence from FDA, USDA initially chose to take a
precautionary approach under this existing statutory regime. Instead
of presuming that existing regulations were adequate to apply also to
GM products, USDA proposed and promulgated regulations specific
to GM products. These regulations made clear that not all GM prod-
ucts would be subject to the FPPA, but went on to state that those GM
products that could be considered "plant pests" under the existing
definition would be subject to a mandatory pre-release permitting
process. 157 As of 1999, USDA had completed more than 6,700 permits
for more than 20,000 locations under this system.I 58
In the regulation, "plant pest" is defined as "[a]ny living stage of
[organism] ... which can directly or indirectly injure or cause disease
or damage in or to any plants or parts thereof, or any processed,
manufactured, or other products of plants."' 59 Those GM products
that would be subject to the FPPA regulations would be those that had
154 7 U.S.C. § 150aa—jj (repealed 2000).
155 Id. § 150dd.
156 Id. § 150aa(c).
157 Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic
Engineering Which Are Plant Pests or Which There is Reason to Believe Are Plant Pests,
52 Fed. Reg. 22,908 ( June 16, 1987) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 330, 560).
158 See CHAIRMAN NICK SI4ITH, SUBCOMM. ON BASIC RESEARCH 01-111E COMM. ON SCI-
ENCE, 106TH CONG., SEEDS or OPPoR -ruNrry: AN ASSESSMENT Or niE BENEFITS, SAFELY,
AND OVERSIGHT Or PLANT GENOMICS AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 26 (Comm.
Print 2000) (citing Sally McCammon, USDA), available at http://mcw.house.goviscience/
smithreport041300.pdf.
"9 7	 § 340.1 (2003).
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been "altered or produced through genetic engineering, if the donor
organism, recipient organisms, or vector agent belongs to any genera
or tax designated in §340.2 and meets the definition of plant pest." 11 °°
It appears, therefore, that the regulation applies to GM plants
simply because they have been produced via the process of genetic en-
gineering. In this sense, USDA's approach is a deviation from the
OSTP policy that regulation should be product-based, and not proc-
ess-based. USDA attempts to deny its divergence in both the preamble
to the proposed rules and the final rules. Its reasoning, however, is
unconvincing. USDA states that the rule is consistent with the Coor-
dinated Framework because it applies to "only genetically engineered
organisms or products which are plant pests or for which there is rea-
son to believe are plant pests, and not to ... an organism or product
merely because of the process by which it was produced."" Neverthe-
less, the language of the regulation makes clear that the trigger is the
GM process, as well as meeting the plant-pesticide definition.
As USDA gained experience with GM plants, it modified its regu-
lations to make them more consistent with the policy of minimal
regulation in the absence of measurable risk. USDA, however, never
moved away from its initial process-based approach. In 1992, the
agency proposed a notification process by which certain organisms
would not be subject to the pre-introduction permitting process. 162
This process allowed plants that met certain criteria to avoid the de-
tailed informational requirements established in the permit rule.
Notification also streamlined the process, permitting applicants to
introduce their plant. varieties without waiting for a lengthy agency
review. The six criteria used to determine eligibility for the less de-
tailed petition process were:
(1) whether the plant is corn, cotton, potato, soybean, to-
bacco or tomato;
(2) whether the genetic material is integrated in a stable
manner;
(3) whether the function of the introduced genetic material
is known and does not result in a plant disease;
16° Id.
181 Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic
Engineering Which are Plant Pests or Which there is Reason to Believe are Plant Pests, 52
Fed. Reg. 22,892.( July 16, 1987) (to be codified at 2 C.F.R pts. 330. 340).
'" Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Notification Procedures for the
Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; and Petition for Nonregulated Status, 57 Fed.
Reg. 53,036 (proposed Nov. 6, 1992) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
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(4) whether the genetic material does not encode infectious,
toxic or pharmaceutical substances;
(5) whether the genetic material does not pose the risk of a
new plant virus; and
(6) whether the plant does not include genetic material
from a known animal or human pathogen.' 63
Under the notification requirement, the manufacturer or importer
has the responsibility of certifying to the agency that the plant meets
the six requirements. 16" In addition, the notifying party must inform
USDA of its intention to conduct field tests thirty days in advance of
such tests, and to provide information about the plant, time and place
of the test.' 65
USDA has explicitly highlighted its goal of being consistent with
the OSTP and White House policy statements with the introduction of
its notification system. The preamble to the proposed rule states:
This proposed rule is consistent with the overall Federal pol-
icy for the regulation of the products of biotechnology. The
proposed rule would reduce regulatory constraints on cer-
tain introductions to achieve the Federal policy goal of over-
sight commensurate with the risk (Office of Science and
Technology Policy's biotechnology oversight policy docu-
ment (February 27, 1992; 57 Fed. Reg. 6753); the President's
regulatory review initiative of January 28, 1992; and the De-
partment's request for comments (February 25, 1992; 57
Fed. Reg. 6483-6484)). The proposed rule would also
achieve the Federal policy goal of performance-based regu-
latory principles as outlined in the President's Council on
Competitiveness "Report on National Biotechnology Policy"
(February 1991). 166
In promulgating the regulation, USDA also made clear that its aim
was to manage an introduced regulated article so that it or its off-
spring would not persist in the environment. The agency, however,
163 See 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(6); see also USDA, USER'S GUIDE FOR INTRODUCING GENETI-
CALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS AND MICROORGANISMS, TECII. BULL, No. 1783 § IV (rev. ed.
1997), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/bbep/bp/osergd.html.
im 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(d) (2) (v) (2003).
165
 Id. § 340.3(d) (2).
166 See57 Fed. Reg. 53,036 (Nov. 6, 1992) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
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stated that its experience showed that it was unnecessary for certain
products to be subject to the lengthy permit process.'"
Industry generally supported USDA's decision to streamline the
process. 168 Critics, however, complained that the notification process
would effectively shield the release of GM plants from the public. In
addition, critics charged that the move to a notification system was
premature and not based on convincing data. 169 USDA disagreed with
both of these comments, noting that the agency had a history of pub-
lic involvement in decision making and that the agency was confident
that the nonregulated plants did not pose a risk.'"
USDA amended its regulations again in 1997 to open the
notification process to any plant species—not just the six listed—
meeting the six requirements, as long as those species had similar
"low risk" characteristics. 171 In its preamble to this proposed rule,
USDA revealed its enthusiasm for the technology by predicting that
eventually eighty to ninety percent of all GM plants would be
introduced under the simplified procedure. 172 Eventually, the agency
stated that it expects that as many as ninety-nine percent of all crops
could be introduced by notification. 175
At the time the notification system was proposed in 1992, USDA
also introduced a petition process by which parties could establish
that GM products should be exempt from either the permitting or
notification process. USDA uses the term "nonregulated" to refer to
such plants. The petition process thus gave applicants a route for es-
tablishing that their GM products were not "plant pests" and thus
167 See id.
168 See 58 Fed. Reg. 17,044 (Mar. 31, 1993) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Simplification of Requirements
and Procedures for Genetically Engineered Organism, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,945 (May 2, 1997)
(codified at 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.0, 340.3).
177 Judith E. Beach, Ph.D., No "Killer Tomatoes": Easing Federal Regulation of Genetically
Engineered Plants, 53 Fool) DRUG 1.4 181, 183 (1998). USDA describes the notification
program in an industry guideline as being the simplest way to obtain APHIS permission
to import, move, field test a genetically engineered plant • . applicable in the vast majority
of cases," USDA, Permitting, Notification, and Deregulation, at http://www.aphis.usda ,
gov/ppq/biotech/ (last visited May 14, 2003).
1 " Beach, supra note 172, at 183. At the same time, it should be noted that the USDA
has been working on new rules for the review of GM crops to account for the availability of
GM crops, since the United States Congress updated a major plant law. USDA: Federal GM
Reviewers are 'superficial' and protective of big business, says report, just-Foon, Feb. 22, 2002,
available at http://www.just-food.com/uews_details.asp?art=  47999.
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were not subject to other FPPA or USDA regulations. 174 A successful
petition for nonregulated status would be one that demonstrated that
a GM product did not pose a greater plant pest risk than the un-
modified organism from which it was derived. 175
USDA's 1997 modifications to its regulations also expanded the
class of potentially nonregulated organisms. USDA stated that non-
regulated status would be extended to GM plants that were "closely
related" to a GM plant that had been granted nonregulated status
under a petition. 176 Thus, once a GM plant had been granted non-
regulated status tinder a petition, all "closely related" plants would
also be exempt."7 A party simply had to certify to USDA that an arti-
cle was "closely related."'"
USDA stated that it had taken this measure to streamline further
the regulatory process based on risk principles. 179 In its comments,
the agency took the position that any such extensions of nonregulated
status would be based on clear scientific evidence.m It is worth not-
ing, however, that USDA offered no clear definition of what level of
similarity would demonstrate "closely related" status or how the
agency would assess whether specific gene insertions create unreason-
able levels of risk. 181 Even as USDA has implemented this provision,
these standards have remained unclear.
Each of USDA's successive moves was accompanied by great
agency confidence in its capacity to ensure safety even while stream-
lining requirements. With respect to the 1997 modifications, the dep-
uty director for biotechnology at APHIS confidently stated that there
was "no scientific evidence that genetically engineered plants present
health and safety risk for humans."182 He added that "` [t] he more
time goes by the more information comes in to validate .
APHIS.' " 83
Critics, however, have sharply criticized the 1997 modifications as
opening a "huge loophole ... under which risk assessments of paten-
174 7 C.F.R. § 340.6 (2003).
09 Id.





181 62 Fed. Reg. at 23,952.
182 EU/US Pempectives on Labeling Genetically Engineered Foods, Foot) CHEMICAL NEWS,
June 1998, at 19 (hereinafter EU/US Perspectives).
nu Id. (quoting Arnold Foudin, deputy director for biotechnology, APHIS).
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daily dangerous new varieties would not be made." 184 Critics pointed
out that the lack of clarity as to what organisms would be considered
"closely related" opened the nonregulated status petition process to
potential abuses.'" At the time the rule was finalized, USDA re-
sponded that safety was ensured whether the GM organism was under
a permit or a notification, or was nonregulated. USDA pointed out
that any company introducing a GM product has obligations to certify
that the plant or organism meets regulatory safety standards and
these obligations ensure that companies will remain in compliance.'"
USDA further noted that it conducts inspections at various intervals
of time, again ensuring compliance.'"
In fact, USDA's actions on GM products have been the subject of
extensive criticism. Many have pointed out that the agency has an in-
ternal conflict of interest on the regulation of GM products, as it does
for all newly introduced plants. Indeed, USDA's APHIS unit is respon-
sible for issuing regulations and reviewing releases of GM organisms
in the environment.'" At the same time, the Agricultural Research
Service ("ARS") and Agricultural Marketing Service ("AMS") of
USDA are geared toward developing and promoting agricultural bio-
technology in the United States and internationally. ARS, for exam-
ple, is partially responsible for developing and promoting the contro-
versial "Terminator" technology.'" A division of the Food Safety
Inspection Service ("FSIS") advocates the U.S. position on regulation
of GM products in international fora such as Codex Alimentaritts.
The U.S. Codex Commission, housed in FSIS, has consistently taken a
strong position that. GM products pose no novel risks and should not
be the subject of extensive process-based regulations.
An example of this internal conflict was on display in a speech
given by Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman at the United Na-
tions Food and Agriculture Organization's ("FAO") 31st Confer-
' 84 62 Fed. Reg. 23.945, 23,952 (May 2, 1997) (to he codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
185 id.
126 Id.
187 Id. at 23.953.
188 See EU/US PerSpediVe. WPM note 182, at 20.
189 'Ter min a tor" technology is the popular name used to describe genetic seed sterili-
zation, which USDA developed and patented in 1998 together with Delta & Pine Land, the
world's largest cotton company. The technology is used to make the seeds of a plant sterile,
so that they cannot be used for a new generation of plants. Seed sterilization was devel-
oped to allow seed companies to protect their patents on novel varieties: with the technol-
ogy in place, a seed company ensures that purchasers cannot make second generation uses
of the patented seeds it sells.
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ence.m Secretary Veneman touted the benefits of GM crops and went
so far as to promote American products: "[B]iotechnology .. will re-
invigorate productivity growth in food and agriculture production
and .. make agriculture more environmentally sustainable. Agricul-
tural biotechnology ... also promises much more, such as drought .
resistant crop varieties for Africa:1 g' To critics, such statements prove
that USDA has no interest in upholding stringent regulations on the
GM industry.
At the end of the Clinton Administration, then-USDA Secretary
Dan Glickman acknowledged the institutional conflict of interest, and
announced measures to combat its effects in decision making. 192
Among the measures proposed were independent scientific reviews of
USDA's biotechnology approval process, a reinforced line between
agency regulatory functions and promotions of trade, and the con-
vening of a panel of representatives from industry, farm, consumer
and environmental groups to advice on issues related to GM foods.'"
With the change in Administrations, however, this proposal does not
appear to have gone forward. As a result, it is not clear whether the
proposal would have placated critics.
USDA has also been criticized for lax oversight on the permit ap-
plications and notification petitions it does receive. Currently, APHIS
receives approximately 1,000 notifications each year from biotechnol-
ogy companies wishing to field-test new transgenic plants or petition-
ing to have a plant deregulated altogether. 194
 Field-testing of the vast
majority of transgenic plants is conducted under the notification pro-
cess introduced in the 1992 modification to the regulation. 195
The National Academy of Sciences ("NAS"), a nonprofit society
of scholars in scientific and engineering fields, published a report in
2002 sharply criticizing USDA oversight. 196
 The report was intended
to investigate how the government evaluates (lie potential environ-
19° Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman, Remarks at the U.N. Food and Agricul-
ture Organization 31st Conference Plenary Session: State of Food and Agriculture, Rome,
Italy (Nov. 5, 2001), available at lutp://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2001/11/0222.hun.
191 Id.
192 Bette Hileman, News of the Week CHEMICAL R ENGINEERING NEws, July 19, 1999;
Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman, Remarks to the National Press Club ( July 13,
1999), available at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/
 1999/07/0285.
199 Glickman, supm note 192.
194
 Press Release, National Academy of Sciences, Regulations of Transgenic Plants
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mental- risks posed by GM crops. After a detailed examination of the
USDA regulatory framework, the report concluded that reviews of
permit applications and notifications were "generally superficial" and
that the review process "should be made significantly more transpar-
ent and rigorous," with more input from the pubic and external sci-
entific experts. 197
Specifically, the NAS report identified an instance in which a va-
riety of corn producing a protein with insecticidal properties was
grown commercially, following a notification, without any thorough
consideration by the manufacturer or the agency of the impacts of the
insecticide on the environment. 198 In addition, NAS found fault with
the fact that once USDA accepts a petition for nonregulated status, it
does not conduct post-commercialization monitoring for environ-
mental effects. 199 According to NAS, without such systematic monitor-
ing, there is no Way to ensure that nonregulated status is appropriate
and that environmental damage has not occurred. 209 The report also
noted that the amount of information kept secret by USDA "hampers
external review and transparency of the decision-making process."201
Ultimately, NAS did not advise doing away with the notification proc-
ess, but rather recommended more thorough screening of submis-
sions so that careful reviews are conducted where merited. 202 At this
time, it is unclear what effect, if any, the report will have on USDA
procedures.
The process for petitioning for nonregulated status, introduced
in 1997, has also been the subject of extensive criticism. The Natural
Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"), an environmental organiza-
tion, filed a petition with USDA in April 2000 to demand that the
agency undertake a notice-and-comment rule-making process to es-
tablish prescriptive requirements for field testing and for supporting
information necessary to support petitions for nonregulated status. 293
NRDC pointed to two instances in which USDA granted petitions for
nonregulated status of two varieties of virally resistant squash without
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Press Release, supra note 194.
200 Id,
2° 1 Jill Carroll, Reviews of Crops Altered by Genetics Are "Supetficial", WALL. S'1'. J., Feb. 21,
2002.
202 Id.
202 Press Release, Natural Resources Defense Council, NRDC-Led Coalition Calls for
USDA to Stop Environmentally Harmful Release of Genetically Engineered Crops (Apr.
26, 2000).
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adequate consideration of environmental issues. 204 In NRDC's view,
nonregidated status was being granted on an ad hoc basis, without any
external requirements as to the specific information that must form
the basis of any agency decision making. 299 The group accused USDA
of relying on qualitative rationalizations and incomplete field studies
and expressed concern that USDA's grant of nonregulated status to a
variety of plants could have irreversible harmful effects on genetic
diversity and on the plants' traditional counterparts. 206
 There has
been no response from USDA on this matter.
Like FDA, USDA regulations have shifted as greater numbers of
GM products have entered the market. The evolution of USDA's posi-
tion, however, has been converse to the changes instituted by FDA.
USDA began with a position that was more precautionary than the
Coordinated Framework and associated policy statements, but the
agency has steadily shifted to a more risk-based policy. Ultimately, this
shift has meant a smaller regulatory burden for companies moving
forward with GM products.
C. Environmental Protection Agency
EPA is the third agency with major responsibility for oversight of
GM products. EPA has authority to ensure that any such products are
safe for the environment and safe for human uses. Following the Co-
ordinated Framework, EPA took the position that its existing statutory
and regulatory framework under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") would be adequate for GM prod-
ucts. 207
Under FIFRA, "pesticide" is defined broadly to include any sub-
stance "intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating
any pest" or "intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desic-
cant. 2" 08 To register a pesticide, the registrant must demonstrate that
when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized
practice, the pesticide will not generally cause unreasonable adverse
impacts on the environment. 209 In general, this standard requires the




2" 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000).
206 Id. § 136(u).
200 Id. § 136c(d).
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its environmental fate, potential toxicity to humans and other ani-
mals, and its potential for ecological disruption.210
EPA has additional authority under the FFDCA, as amended by
the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act, to set "tolerances"—or permis-
sible levels—of pesticide residues on food."' EPA is directed by statute
to set a tolerance such dial there is "reasonably certainty that no harm
will result" from aggregate exposure to the pesticide over a lifetime. 212
The FFDCA states that a food is adulterated if it contains a pesticide
residue, unless the amount of residue is within an established toler-
ance. 213
Following the publication of the Coordinated Framework, EPA
made clear that it would rely on existing regulations promulgated tin-
der FIFRA to ensure the safety of GM plants with pesticidal properties.
Beyond this, EPA did not issue any further outline detailing its ap-
proach to GM products. After receiving numerous inquiries as to the
data required under F1FRA for registration of GM plants, however,
EPA issued a proposed policy statement in 1994. 214 The aim of the
statement was to clarify the status of EPA regulations under FIFRA
and FFDCA as GM plants became a market reality. 215
In the proposed policy, EPA coined the term "plant-pesticide" to
refer to GM products under EPA authority. By definition, a "plant-
pesticide" was a "pesticidal substance that is produced in a living plant
and the genetic material necessary for the product of the pesticidal
substance, where the pesticidal substance is intended for use in the
living plan t."216 EPA also made clear that it considered its existing re-
view and risk assessment. procedures adequate for GM products. Like
FDA, EPA stated that its approach would be product-based: "EPA indi-
cates that it proposes to focus its regulatory attention on the plant-
pesticide and not on the plant per se." 217
215 40 C.F.R. §§ 158.165, 158.170, 162.163 (2003).
211 21 U.S.C. § 346(a) (2000),
212 Id. § 346(c) (2),
215 In May 1997, EPA published a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to
elicit public comments on its evaluation of the requirements imposed by the Food Quality
Protection Act. Plant-Pesticide: Supplemental Notice and Proposed Rulemaking, 62 Fed.
Reg. 27,132 (proposed May 16, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180).
214 Proposed Policy; Plant-Pesticides Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,496 (Nov.
23, 1994).
215 Id.
216 Id, at 60,500:
217 Id. at 60.498.
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To focus the agency's resources where there was greater risk,
EPA's 1994 proposed policy identified a number of products that
would be exempt because the risks were deemed negligible. 218 Ex-
emptions included plants that already contained some level of the
incorporated pesticide, plants that were sexually compatible with an-
other plant containing some level of the incorporated pesticide, and
those modifications that only affected the plant itself. 219 The agency's
rationale was that "[ijf a plant normally produces a pesticidal sub-
stance, organisms that normally come in contact with the plant have
likely been exposed to that substance in the past." 220 In a further
justification, the agency acknowledged that genetic modification de-
signed to increase the levels of previously existing pesticidal proteins
in plants posed the greatest risk to non-target species. Even so, the
agency reflected that any such increases were not likely to result in
overall significantly different exposures of the non-target organisms to
the public and thus did not need to be targeted by regulation. 221 In
addition, EPA reasoned that transfers between closely related species
would not likely result in levels of toxic proteins that greatly exceeded
the normal range, and that there are limits to which toxic protein can
be increased without unwanted effects on other desirable characteris-
tics of the plant. 222 Thus, EPA concluded that most plants with altered
levels of plant-pesticides would not require registration.
Traditional pesticides subject to FIFRA must undergo an exten-
sive pre-market testing regime laid out in regulations. 225 These tests
are designed io establish environmental and ecological impacts of
pesticides, and predate GM technology. As written, the rules do not
require testing on GM plant-specific issues such as the potential travel
of the genotype into other plants or wider potential ecological effects
on the food chain. Despite EPA's acknowledgement of these issues in
the agency's 1994 proposed policy, the agency has never formally ad-
218 Id. at 60,501.
219 59 Fed. Reg. at 60,502-03.
229 Proposed Policy; Plant-Pesticides Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,496,
60,502 (Nov. 23, 1994).
221 Id.
222
 Id. at 60,503.
22 ' Pesticide Registration Procedures; Pesticide Data Requirements, 53 Fed. Reg.
15,982 (May 4, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 158).
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dressed what kind of testing would be appropriate for plant-pest-
icides. 224
Instead, the agency has stated that it will negotiate applicable
testing requirements with manufacturers on a case by case basis. 225
Thus, EPA encourages prospective plant-pesticide registrants to con-
sult the agency on the types of information relevant to evaluating the
product, though unlike FDA there is no written policy to this effect. 226
The agency then assesses the health and environmental risks posed by
the plan t Testicides and, where appropriate, issues a registration tin-
der FIFRA, All FIFRA registrations contain the built in safety provision
that registrations issued are temporary. Thus, each registrant must
apply for re-registration at periodic intervals, allowing EPA an oppor-
tunity to reevaluate the product.
In 2001, EPA published a rule finalizing elements of the 1994
publication. Inter alia, the final rule changed the name of the regu-
lated element from "plant-pesticide" to "plant incorporated protec-
tant."227 The nomenclature change clarified that a regulated GM
plant was one intended to have pesticidal properties: "Plant incorpo-
rated protectant means a pesticidal substance that is intended to be
produced and used in a living plant, or in the produce thereof, and
the genetic material necessary for production of such a pesticidal sub-
stance."228 Thus, the definition excludes plants with chance pesticidal
modifications. The 2001 rule also affirmed the exemptions contained
224 The 1994 policy promised to issue data requirements for plant-pesticides at some
future date and to solicit comments from the public. Hearing on Plant Genome Science, Sub-
comm. on Basic Research of the House Comm. on Science, 106th Cong. (Oct. 19, 1999) (testi-
mony of Janet L. Andersen, Director, Biopesticides and Pollution Prevention Division,
Office of Pesticide Programs, EPA) [hereinafter Testimony of Janet L. Andersen], available
at h ttp://conundocs.house.gov/ committees/science/ hsy215140.000/hsy215140_1.1nm.
So far, however, this has not taken place.
225 Id. (reflecting that EPA works with each company to determine the appropriate
data requirements).
226 59 Fed. Reg. 60,496, 60,511 (Nov. 23, 1994). The agency also assesses the need for
environmental and ecological risk data on a case by case basis. Each environmental risk
assessment is based on an analysis of the properties of the engineered organism and its
target environment. The degree of EPA scrutiny depends on the type of gene product and
the intended mode of action. Sharlene Matten, EPA Regulation of Plant-Pesticides and Bt
Plant-Pesticide Resistance Management, in AGRICULTURAL BIO'ITCHNOLOGY AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY: GENE ESCAPE AND PEST RESISTANCE 105 (Nat'l Agric. Biotechnology
Council Report No. 10, 1998), available at lutp://www.cals.cornelledu/extension/nabc/
pubs/nabc_10.pdf.
227 RegIllaI1ODS Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for
Plant-Incorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772 ( July 19, 2001) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 152, 174).
228 40 G.F.R. § 152.3 (2003).
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in the 1994 proposal and reiterated EPA's focus on the pesticidal as-
pects of the plant and not on the plant itself, remaining consistent
with White House policy.
As of 1999, EPA had registered twelve plant-pesticide GM prod-
ucts under FIFRA. 229
 Because these registrations were not open to the
public, the range of data reviewed by EPA is not known. As of 1999,
EPA had exempted all plant-pesticides registered for food from the
FFDCA tolerance requirement. The agency's justification in each case
was that the pesticidal proteins originated from sources not known to
be food allergens, and that the plant-pesticides were therefore not
expected to be food allergens.
EPA's position on plant-incorporated pesticides came under
heavy fire in 1999, after the release of a study suggesting that pollen
from GM corn dusted on the leaves of milkweed killed forty-four per-
cent of the caterpillars that fed on it. Monarch caterpillars feed exclu-
sively on milkweed and the study appeared to show that there were
significant ecological impacts that had not been considered by EPA. 239
This laboratory study was later discredited for not accurately
reflecting the behavior of Bt corn pollen in the field. Nevertheless, it
triggered widespread focus on EPA for not recognizing the range of
actual risks presented by GM technologies and not adequately moni-
toring compliance. 231
The monarch butterfly quickly became the motif of protests
against the introduction of GM foods. At the 1999 hearings held by
FDA, for example, protesters dressed as monarch butterflies paraded
outside the hearing sites. In June 1999, the Environmental Defense
Fund ("EDF") called on EPA to require sixty-foot buffer zones around
fields planted with GM corn to protect butterflies. 232 According to
EDF, such borders would dramatically reduce the flow of corn pollen.
In response to the monarch study, EPA scientists said that they
were aware that the Bt pollen could kill insects, but did not believe
the butterflies would be exposed to the toxin. 233 EPA stated that the
subsequent discrediting of the study validated its approach. Nonethe-
less, in January 2000, EPA issued new planting restrictions on GM
229
 Testimony ofJanet L. Andersen. supra note 224.
290 John E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, NATURE, May 20, 1999.
29t
	 generally Thomas McGarity & Patricia Hansen, Breeding Distrust: An Assessment
And Recommendations For Improving The Regulation Of Plant Derived Genetically Moth-
fled Foods ( Jan. 11, 2001), http://www.biotech-info.net/Breeding_Distrust.html .
292 Buffers Urged Arou nd Bt Corn Fields, ENvn.. News NumoRx, July 14, 1999.
299 U.S. Places Restrictions on Biotech Corn, EN VTL. NEWS NE'llVORK, Jan. 17, 2000.
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corn which would require that the crops be mixed with conventional
varieties, in part as a response to the type of concerns raised in the
monarch study. Mixing GM and conventional varieties was to prevent
insects from becoming resistant to the Bt toxin and to reduce expo-
sure to other organisms, such as the monarch butterfly. The new re-
strictions, which EPA drafted jointly with industry; require farmers to
plant at least twenty percent conventional corn in most regions, and
fifty percent where cotton is grown. Seed companies are also required
to expand field monitoring for signs of where insect resistance may be
occurring. 234
Further criticism of the agency's review practices arose after the
NAS published a report in April 2000 titled "Genetically Modified
Pest-Protected Plants: Science and Regulation." 235 Although generally
positive, the NAS report pointed out that EPA and other agencies
needed to coordinate their regulatory authority over GM plant-
pesticides to ensure that there were no adverse effects on human
health and the environment. 236 The NAS report took issue with ex-
emptions for certain transgenic plant-pesticides in EPA's 1994 Pro-
posed Rule and urged EPA to reconsider potential environmental im-
pacts of these varieties. 237 For example, the NAS raised the question of
whether an exemption for introduction of a gene from a sexually
compatible plant was advisable, given the lack of understanding of
expression products. 238 In addition, the NAS recommended the de-
velopment of a strategy for monitoring long-term impacts of plant-
protectant pesticides on human and environmental health.239
With the emergence of the StarLink corn "crisis," even more
pressing questions were raised about EPA's ability to recognize risks
and to monitor compliance appropriately.240 To critics, the StarLink
episode conclusively demonstrated that EPA's approach had failed
and that the agency had not adequately understood the unique risks
posed by a GM product—as opposed to a conventional pesticide—in
234 Id.
235 See generally CONIM. ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS, NAT'L
ACAD. OF SCI., GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS; SCIENCE AND REGULA-
'110N (2000).
236 See id. at 37-38.
297 Id.
298
299 Id. at 63.
240
 For a detailed discussion of the development and impact of the StarLink crisis, see
Dorothy Nelkin & Emily Marden, The Starlink Controversy: The Competing Frames of Risk Dis-
putes, INTIJ. BIOTECHNOLOGY (forthcoming 2003).
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its FIFRA review. In EPA's eyes, the episode simply represented a bad
judgement that has no bearing on overall regulatory structure.
StarLink is the trade name for GM corn hybrids produced by
Aventis Crop Science of Research Triangle Park, North Carolina.
StarLink hybrids contain a plant-pesticide protein (Cry9C) derived
from the common soil microbe Bacillus thuringiensis ("Bt"), which
kills certain destructive pests of corn such as the European corn
borer. 24 ' In May 1998, the originator of the technology, Plant Genetic
Systems Inc. registered StarLink corn under FIFRA with EPA. The reg-
istration was subsequently transferred to AgrEvo USA and then to
Aventis. At the time of the registration, Plant Genetic Systems had
presented health and safety tests that it believed indicated that the
Cry9C protein contained in StarLink did not resemble any known al-
lergens. But the science of identifying potential allergens is inexact,
and despite the company's protestations, EPA's Scientific Advisory
Panel concluded that results did not rule out the potential for aller-
genicity. The agency identified two particular concerns: one test
showed that Cry9C protein could survive cooking or processing and
another test determined that Cry9C is hard to digest. 242
Despite the uncertain data, EPA took the unusual step of issuing
a "split registration," which limited use of the product to animal feed
or industrial purposes—and restricted it from human use. 243
 The split
registration required that systems be in place to prevent StarLink
from entering the human food supply. Thus, growers had to agree
that the corn would not be sold for food and that they would adopt
practices to preserve the identity of the crop and prevent cross polli-
241
 There are several chronologies of this dispute. Information is available at the Aven-
tis Web site, http://www.aventis.com , and on the Greenpeace Web site, http://www.green-
peace.org.
242 See Allergenicity Assessment of Cry9C BT Corn Plant Pesticide, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,452
(Dec. 21, 1999) (discussing the history of the allergenicity assessment).
243
 Issuing a split registration is a fairly common practice by EPA with conventional
pesticides, as each registration specifies the crops on which the pesticide can be used. The
typical split registration, before StarLink, might allow pesticide use an corn, but not on
soy, for example. Split registrations had not, however, been previously used for a GM
product and the agency failed to recognize the possible risk of contamination. It is worth
noting that AgrEvo and then Aventis (the patent changed hands several times) asked EPA
in 1999 and again in late 2000 to re-evaluate the evidence and consider registering Star-
Link for human uses as well. In each case, EPA's Scientific Advisory Panel noted that the
data was insufficient to rule out potential allergenicity issues. See generally CTR. FOR FOOD
SAFETY tic APPLIED NUTRITION, FDA, FDA EVALUATIONS OF CONSUMER COMPLAINTS
LINKED TO FOODS ALLEGEDLY CONTAINING STARLINK CORN (2001), available at Imp://
www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/2001/july/fda.pdf.
2003]	 Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified Food & Agriculture 	 783
nation with other hybrids. 244 In some ways, EPA appears to have issued
the split registration in disregard of the ability of farmers to track
their varieties and the risks of containment. From the outset, the 660-
foot buffer between corn grown for human versus animal uses ap-
peared to many to be naively insufficient. 245
At its peak, StarLink corn was only grown on a small portion of
the nation's corn acreage, and did not attract much attention. Thus, it
was a surprise to consumers, regulators, and farmers alike when, in
September 2000, a coalition of consumer and environmental groups
called Genetic Engineering Food Alert hired Genetic ID, an inde-
pendent testing laboratory, to test samples of corn products. The lab
found traces of StarLink in Kraft taco shells that were widely sold un-
der the brand name Taco Bell. As publicity mounted, StarLink con-
tinued to be detected in a range of other food products in the United
States and Japan. FDA and USDA recalled contaminated food prod-
ucts and offered to buy remaining StarLink products from farmers.
Ultimately; under pressure of negative publicity, the company volun-
tarily withdrew its registration so that StarLink would no longer be
authorized for commercial use.
The StarLink crisis created a public challenge to the adequacy of
EPA's approach to GM products. In issuing a split registration for
StarLink, the agency had stated that it was acting in response to the
lack of identified risks associated with the product. But this approach
was implemented without consideration of whether planting restric-
tions would be adequately communicated to farmers, and whether
agency enforcement was available. Many pointed out that contamina-
tion was inevitable given the lack of enforcement capacity at EPA. 24°
The incident resulted in public calls for validated testing procedures
and mandatory pre-market reviews by experts outside the govern-
men t. 247
Within EPA itself, the application of the FIFRA regime has not
changed. When the StarLink crisis broke, EPA was in the midst of a
241 Neil Hari et al., The StarLink Situation ( July 30, 2001) (unpublished manuscript).
215 See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, 1999 Survey on Genetically Altered Corn Disclosed Some lui-
pmper Uses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2001 (revealing that EPA was aware of containment prob-
lems with StarLink as early as 1999. just a year after the product was first commercialized).
' 246 McGarity, supra note 20, at 108.
247 ALEJANDRO E. SEGARRA & JEAN M. RAWSON, STARLINK CORN CONTROVERSY: BACK-
GROUND (Gong. Research Sere. Report No. RS20732, Jan. 10, 2001), available at Imp://
wwwilcseonline.org/NLE/GRSreports/Agriculture/ag-101.pdf.
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reassessment of several unrelated Bt Corn and cotton products 248
 for
re-registration purposes.249
 The Bt products under consideration had
not, like StarLink, been subject to split registrations. Many critics,
however, had hoped that the StarLink incident would lead the agency
to take a more precautionary approach to GM products of all types.
In October 2001, EPA announced that the review had confirmed
that the agency's existing regulation and risk strategies were sufficient
to ensure safety to the environment. The agency therefore re-
registered these substances and authorized continued commercial
planting for seven more years. 25°
EPA has not shifted its approach, even as challenges to the
agency have emerged. EPA viewed plant-incorporated pesticides as
merely an additional variety of pesticide covered under FIFRA, and
takes essentially the same position today. In this sense, the EPA ap-
proach is perhaps the most accurate reflection of the vision of the
drafters of the Coordinated Framework and associated policy docu-
ments.
CONCLUSION
U.S. regulatory policy on GM food and crops, as exercised by
FDA, USDA, and EPA, was developed according to three basic princi-
ples adopted by successive Administrations. These principles included
(1) a product-based approach, (2) treatment of GM products as being
on a continuum with other agricultural innovations, and (3) the posi-
tion that regulatory action should be based on demonstrable "sci-
entific risk" rather than precaution.
For the most part, the agencies continue to adhere explicitly to
these three principles. In fact, however, as the presence of GM prod-
ucts has increased, each agency's policy has been subject to criticism
and challenges and thus been forced to evolve. FDA, for example, ini-
tially took a strong position that all regulation would be product-
248
 This re-review did not include StarLink. As noted, the registration for this product
had been voluntarily withdrawn by the company.
249
 The reassessment was announced by.EPA in Time Extension for B.t. Corn and B.t.
Cotton Plant-Pesticides Expiring Registrations, 65 Fed. Reg. 48.701 (Aug, 9. 2000), and was
a response to an initiative by the Clinton Administration to review policies on food bio-
technology. See also Announcement of Public meeting; Opportunity to Comment on Im-
plications of Revised Bt Crops Reassessment for Regulatory Decisions Affecting These
Products, and on Potential Elements of Regulatory Options, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,227 ( July 17,
2001).
250 See, e.g., 65 Fed. Reg. at 48,701,
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based, and that the risks posed by GM products were no different
than risks posed by foods produced from traditional methods. In as-
serting this position, FDA-went so far as to presume the safety of most
GM products, based on their substantial equivalence to existing prod-
ucts. FDA also declined to recognize asserted safety risks—such as al-
lergenicity—in the absence of demonstrable harms. Consistent with
these positions, FDA declined to embrace mandatory labeling of GM
products.
As the agency responsible for ensuring the safety of the food
supply, FDA's approach was subject to thoroughgoing criticism from
the outset. In part as a result of these challenges, FDA has moved away
from the three principles outlined by the Administration while deny-
ing any such movement. In fact, the agency continues to take a prod-
uct-based approach. Based on the increasing number of GM products
being developed, however, FDA has introduced a mandatory pre-
market consultation program specifically for products created
through bioengineering. In introducing this change, FDA was careful
to insist that it has not changed its risk strategy, and that there is still
no evidence that GM products are harmful. In addition, FDA now
permits voluntary labeling regarding GM content, though it contin-
ues to insist that any language suggesting that GM products are dif-
ferent or less safe is false and misleading.
Like FDA, USDA insisted that its approach would adhere to the
White House principles as GM products began to near market readi-
ness. Despite these assurances, however, USDA initially implemented
a precautionary approach for GM products, according to which it sub-
jected them to a permit requirement. As its experience with GM
products grew, USDA moved away from the precautionary approach.
The department now explicitly states that it hopes to free most. GM
products from burdensome pre-market requirements based on the
lack of risk connected to the technology. USDA has, however, retained
its process-based regulatory framework and continues to rely on a
permitting and notification system specifically for GM products.
For its part, EPA has remained consistently committed to the
White House approach, though it too is subject to increasing pressure
for change. At the time the Coordinated Framework was developed,
EPA's existing regulatory framework appeared consistent with White
House principles: the definition of "pesticide" contained in FIFRA was
written broadly enough to include GM products without question and
already had a product-based approach. Moreover, existing regulations
tinder FIFRA were designed to regulate according to verifiable risks,
consistent with the Coordinated Framework. EPA continues to ap-
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proach GM products from this perspective. The Monarch butterfly
and StarLink episodes, however, have raised questions about the
agency's ability to consider adequately and then monitor environ-
mental risks unique to GM products.
Ultimately, it is likely that the regulatory framework will continue
to evolve. The changing nature of the technology itself, however,
makes it difficult to predict the direction of future regulation. The
first generation of GM products has focused primarily on improving
agronomic traits for the producer, such as herbicide resistance or pest
resistance. A second generation of GM products is, however, emerg-
ing. These products aim at improving food attributes such as nutri-
tional values, color, texture, flavor, or processing properties. Products,
that have been promised include rice with high vitamin A content,
potatoes that are less fat-absorbing during frying, and tomatoes with
increased levels of flavonols. The shifting nature of these products
could open the door to greater consumer receptiveness for GM prod-
ucts. Alternatively, if concerns about safety, labeling, or contamination
are not resolved, these second generation products may not reach the
commercialization stage.
In addition, ongoing conflicts in the international arena will
likely impact the domestic regulatory environment. At present,
groups including the Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD"), the
World Trade Organization, Codex Alimentarius, G8, the Organization
for Economic Development, the World Bank, and the United Nations
provide for a debate on the application and regulation of GM tech-
nology in foods and agriculture. 251
Consistent with domestic policies, the United States has thus far
taken a strong position in opposition to any efforts to regulate GM
technology based on the development process, or on grounds of po-
tential health or environmental risks. In discussions of the Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission ("Codex"), a joint venture of the World
Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the UN, the United States has consistently sparred with Europeans
over the incorporation of the Precautionary Principle into regulation
of GM technology. 252
 In addition, the United States and its allies in
the so-called "Miami Group" stood firm against efforts by the Euro-
251
 For discussion of the roles of these various groups, see George E.C. York, Global
Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: The New Legal Architecture of International Agriculture
Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 423, 428, 454-65 (2001).
252 E.g. FDA Public Meeting on the Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on
Food Derived from Biotechnology (Dec. 15, 1999) (memorandum on file with author).
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pean Commission and others negotiating the CBD to permit non-
scientifically base measures to justify exclusion of GM products from
entry into a country. 255
With respect to labeling, the United States has warned other
countries that it will consider trade sanctions in response to labeling
frameworks that it regards as non-scientifically based and exclusion-
ary. The European Parliament voted in favor of mandatory labels on a
food or food product containing 0.5% of a GM ingredient in July
2002, 254 and the United States stated that the action could "seriously
impair trade in agricultural biotech products." 255
The trajectory of these conflicts is not clear. To the degree that
international bodies endorse regulatory frameworks for GM products
that conflict with the United States, however, there will be domestic
impacts. Regulatory assurances alone cannot sell products.
253 See York, supra note 251.
254 EuR, PAHL, Doc.(COM (2001) 182-05-0380/01-2001/0180 (COD)) (2002); see also
Press Release, Seed Quest, European Parliament Votes on Traceability and Labelling of
GMOs (July 3, 2002), available at http://www.seedquest.co ►/News/releases/2002/july/
4622.1itm. The current E.U. labeling threshold is one percent. Brandon Mitchener, EU
Nears Stricter GMO Food Labels, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2002, at A8. The vote was only the second
step in a legislative process that could take until next year to complete.
235 Mitchener, supra note 254, at A8.
